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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Prosecutors have a very unique role: Prosecutors represent society-all of the members of 
society, including victims and defendants. In this regard, prosecutors have a duty to ensure 
the fairness of criminal proceedings. The United States Supreme Court noted in Berger v. 
United States: 
[The prosecutor] is the representative not of an ordinary party to a 
controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as 
compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in 
a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be 
done.1 
Because of this role, the ethical standards imposed upon prosecutors are extraordinary; 
prosecutorial misconduct is not tolerated. In fact, the Berger Court recognized that while it is 
a prosecutor's recognized duty to "use every legitimate means available to bring about a just 
[conviction]," he or she may not use "improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful 
conviction."2 
Over the last few years, there seems to have been a concerted effort to discredit the 
prosecutorial profession. A few news organizations, including the Chicago Tribune and 
USA Today, have issued results of unscientific surveys that attempt to demonstrate that 
prosecutorial misconduct is a significant issue in the federal courts as well as in some state 
courts. None of these surveys has been able to uncover any but the rarest instances of 
intentional misconduct by prosecutors, state or federal. 
Most of these reports succumb to their own inaccuracies and die a natural death. One 
recent report, however, has managed to gain some public traction. The Northern California 
Innocence Project's Veritas Initiative conducted and published a "study" referred to 
generally as the "NCIP Report." This initial lengthy document, Preventable Error: A Report on 
Prosecutorial Misconduct in California, 1997-2009, was followed up by an "addendum" of the 
same data: the First Annual Report: Preventable Errors- Prosecutorial Misconduct in California 
2010.3 
1. Berger v. United States (1935) 295 U.S. 78, 88. 
2. I d. [Emphasis added.] 
3. The Veritas Initiative, the "investigative watchdog" entitity of the Northern California Innocence 
Project, published two connected reports. The first was authored by Kathleen M. Ridolfi and Maurice 
Possley: Preventable Error-A Report on Prosecutorial Misconduct in California 1997-2009, released on 
October 4, 2010; it is referred to in this document as the NCIP Report. The second publication, written 
by Maurice Possley and Jessica Seargeant, amended and updated the first report; First Annual Report: 
Preventable Error-Prosecutorial Misconduct in California, 2010 (March 2011) shall be quoted to as the 
NCIP First Annual Report. 
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Upon analysis, the NCIP Report, like many of its ilk, is not a study in the scientific tradition. 
Rather, it is an unscientific survey of published cases and media stories conducted by law 
school students. Riddled with inaccuracies, misleading information, and unprofessional 
analyses, it makes recommendations for reform based upon questionable data. Not only 
does this report ignore the historical context of time-tested principles and how they apply to 
the modern judicial and prosecution function, it is singularly lacking in any understanding 
of how a District Attorney's Office actually operates and the training provided to deputy 
district attorneys. Lastly, it fails to anticipate the consequences to the justice system were its 
recommendations adopted. 
The NCIP Report itself received only spotty coverage in the California media, perhaps due 
to its readily apparent lack of credibility. When the few news organizations that covered 
the story actually checked on the information contained in the NCIP Report, they quickly 
learned that the claims were largely inflated. 
Prosecutorial misconduct is an important issue to the public served by the justice system. 
It is taken very seriously by District Attorneys, United States Attorneys, and Attorneys 
General throughout the nation. These criminal justice professionals have taken extraordinary 
measures to ensure misconduct does not happen in the first place and, on the rare occasion 
where it does happen, to discipline the prosecutor involved and right any wrong engendered 
by such conduct. 
Under established case law, the "use of deceptive or reprehensible methods to attempt to 
persuade either the court or the jury" supports a finding of misconduct regardless of whether 
the outcome of the trial is affected.4 While most prosecutors embrace their role and the 
standards to which they are held as they strive for justice in their cases, there are occasionally 
those few who disregard this duty. Such intentional wrongdoing in order to manipulate the 
progress or outcome of a case is a very serious matter and is rightfully grounds for personnel 
action, State Bar prosecution, and potential civil or criminal prosecution. 
Allegations and the consequences of misconduct are serious, and, therefore, a prosecutor 
facing such allegations is entitled to a hearing before a trial court and a factual determination 
of whether or not he or she has committed misconduct. Admittedly, the NCIP Report has 
identified a small number of cases where prosecutors have committed such egregious 
acts-cases where intentional acts of prosecutorial misconduct have been found. The report 
creates an incorrect impression about the frequency with which such misconduct occurs, 
reaching beyond the stated time period to include additional occasions. In the instances 
where intentional misconduct has been found, the prosecutors have been justifiably removed 
from their positions, sanctioned by the State Bar, faced civil or criminal actions, and had the 
related convictions reversed. 
The NCIP Report's portrayal of misconduct is grossly exaggerated, characterizing mere 
mistakes and errors as "misconduct" and classifying cases where such errors occur in the 
same categories as those involving intentional misconduct.5 While it is true that misconduct 
4. People v. Gionis (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1196, 1214-1216; People v. Roldan (2005) 35 Cal.4th 646, 719; People v. 
Adanandus (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 496, 514-515. 
5. A review of the NCIP Report methodology reveals its sources of information to include media reports. 
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may occur as a result of unintentional activity, without bad faith, the actions of a prosecutor 
support a finding of misconduct only if the criminal trial was rendered unfair as a result. 6 
During a criminal trial, a case is developed through the presentation of evidence. 
Subjective decisions and judgment calls by prosecutors must be made under rapidly 
evolving circumstances, and, as a result, mistakes may be made. As in the practice of other 
professions, perfection is unrealistic, and a defendant is not entitled to a "perfect" trial; she 
or he is entitled to a fair triaF In the event an error is made by a prosecutor during trial, the 
court has many options for minimizing its effect such as by barring evidence, instructing the 
jury, or allowing certain remedial actions by opposing counsel. As long as the error does not 
result in the deprivation of a fair trial, no legal misconduct exists. 
The importance of the distinction between error and misconduct is so significant that 
in 2010, the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association adopted the following 
resolution: 
RESOLVED, That the American Bar Association urges trial and appellate courts, 
in criminal cases, when reviewing the conduct of prosecutors to differentiate 
between "error" and "prosecutorial misconduct."8 
The ABA Report that accompanies the resolution noted that, 
[a] finding of "prosecutorial misconduct" may be perceived as reflecting 
intentional wrongdoing, or even professional misconduct, even in cases where 
such a perception is entirely unwarranted, and this Resolution is directed at 
this perception. 9 
The NCIP Report fails to make the distinction between error and misconduct. That failure, 
in effect, sensationalizes the report's "findings" and serves to vilify the public prosecutor. 
Legal misconduct is a subject that prosecutors do not shy away from. They know that it 
deserves thoughtful discussion. They also know that a thoughtful discussion should be 
based on what prosecutors always insist on, the actual law and the actual facts. 
The NCIP Report is wrong. This response clarifies the many instances in which the 
NCIP Report is wrong, in not only the data it relies on, but, most importantly, in 
the recommendations it advocates. Those recommendations would undermine the 
independence of the California prosecutor. They would further the goal of organized 
groups of defense lawyers to weaken District Attorney Offices and make prosecutors more 
amenable to their demands. As a byproduct, they would impose enormous costs on the 
taxpayers who fund the criminal justice system. Most importantly, the public safety of 
Californians would be compromised. 
WHO IS A PROSECUTOR? 
Among the best trained attorneys in the world, California prosecutors dedicate themselves 
to the highest ethical standards in the profession. Their independence ensures that neither 
6. People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800. [Emphasis added.] 
7. In re Pratt (1980) 112 Cal.App.3d 795. 
8. ABA Resolution 100B, adopted August 9-10, 2010. <http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/ 
migrated/leadership/2010/annual/pdfs/lOOb.authcheckdam.pdf>. 
9. Id. at 1. 
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riches and influence nor passion in the streets dictate the outcomes of criminal and civil 
cases. These prosecutors hold the powerful accountable. At the same time, they protect the 
weak and seek justice for the poor, the oppressed, and those whose voices are not always 
strong enough to be heard. It is not unusual for prosecutors in the same District Attorney's 
Office to be pursuing a corrupt politician or white collar criminal protected by a battery 
of defense lawyers, while their colleagues are in the courtroom next door giving voice to a 
victim of domestic violence or to an abused child. 
American prosecutors are professionals concerned solely with justice. Their decisions are free 
from political partisanship. Their dedication is to the Constitution and the laws of the land. 
American prosecutors do not apologize for seeking justice for victims of crimes. Nor are they 
reticent in pursuing the guilty with all the legal means at their disposal. The justice system 
depends on independent prosecutors. 
INTEGRITY 
As a whole, California prosecutors maintain the highest caliber of ethics in the law, 
conducting themselves according to standards that have evolved over decades to guide 
their discretion and ensure that justice is done. Criminals must be brought to justice; 
civilized society requires it as part of the social compact. Prosecutors ensure that the guilty 
are properly punished under the law, while observing the due process requirements of our 
constitution and vigilantly guarding against doing any harm to the innocent. 
Most District Attorney's Offices prominently display a written code of ethics and, as a matter 
of policy, require deputy district attorneys to conduct themselves accordingly. The following 
Prosecutor Code of Ethics from the Tulare County District Attorney's Office is offered as a 
sample: 
Prosecutor Code of Ethics 
As a prosecutor, I pledge myself to truth and the protection of the community. I will 
safeguard lives and property. I will protect the peaceful against violence. I will protect 
the weak and the innocent against deception, oppression, and intimidation. I will 
respect the constitutional rights of all people to liberty, equality, and justice. 
I will not tolerate crime and will relentlessly prosecute criminals. I will strive to 
convict the guilty and to exonerate the innocent. I will never support unnecessary 
force or violence. I will maintain confidences and confidential information pursuant to 
the law and the regulations of my office. I will maintain courage and calm in the face 
of danger, scorn, or ridicule. 
I will enforce the law courteously and appropriately without malice, fear, or favor. I 
will never accept gratuities in the exercise of my professional discretion. 
I will be honest in thought and deed in my personal life, as in my profession. I will be 
exemplary in obeying the law of the land. I will demonstrate self restraint and be 
constantly mindful of the welfare of others. 
I recognize the badge of my office as a symbol of public trust. I accept it as an honor to 
be held so long as I am true to the ethics of prosecution. 
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In California, ethics training is constant and continuous throughout a prosecutor's career. 
It is provided both in-house at the various county offices and at statewide seminars and 
conferences sponsored by the California District Attorneys Association as well as the 
National District Attorneys Association. As attorneys at law, prosecutors must maintain the 
same Continuing Legal Education credits in the area of ethics as any other attorney and must 
pass the same professional responsibility exam. 
As expanded on by the 1998 court in People v. Hill, 
A prosecutor is held to a standard higher than that imposed on other attorneys 
because of the unique function he or she performs in representing the interests, 
and in exercising the sovereign power, of the state .... As the United States 
Supreme Court has explained, the prosecutor represents "a sovereignty whose 
obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; 
and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a 
case, but that justice shall be done."10 
Prosecutors are well aware that they are measured by a more exacting standard. That is why 
they place such emphasis on integrity in training, office administration, and in court. 
Integrity is one of the values that prosecutors take most seriously. One reason the NCIP 
Report is so disturbing to prosecutors in California is not because it says negative things 
about them. Scurrilous remarks from defense attorneys or their spokespersons are part of 
the life of a prosecutor. Rather, what is most disturbing about the actions of the NCIP is that 
they can make an accusation so recklessly. Charging someone with wrongdoing based only 
upon credible evidence is part and parcel of being a prosecutor. It is taken very seriously 
from the first charging document prepared under the watchful eye of a senior prosecutor 
to the sign off on a complex murder information. Not so, apparently, for the authors of 
the NCIP Report. They make charges based not upon evidence but rather on speculation, 
exaggeration, and even known falsehoods. 
In this regard, it is striking how willing the authors of the NCIP Report are to contend that 
the absence of evidence is no bar to reaching a conclusion of culpability. For example, on 
pages 2 and 3 of the report, they allege, without any proof whatsoever, that the instance of 
prosecutorial misconduct, even in their report, is understated. Prosecutors know better than 
to make charges without evidence. 
INDEPENDENCE 
The Principle of Absolute Immunity Is Necessary to Preserve the Historical Independence 
of the American Prosecutor 
The role of the American prosecutor is unique to our system of justice. An independent 
gatekeeper to the criminal justice system, the prosecutor determines whether a criminal case 
is pursued and whether a person will face charges for criminal conduct. In this function, 
the prosecutor's position is unlike any other in the world. The prosecutor is the chief law 
enforcement officer of the county. As a member of the Executive Branch of government, 
the prosecutor initiates criminal cases and conducts the prosecution. It is he or she who 
represents the People and who is the attorney and advocate for the citizens of his or her 
jurisdiction. 
10. People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 820, quoting Berger v. United States (1935) 295 U.S. 78, 80. 
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Prosecutors make thousands of decisions every day, all over the state and country. Those 
decisions are critical. They can be difficult and must often be made quickly; but they are 
made without bias and without favoritism. And they are made without fear of retaliation for 
an official act or exercise of judgment. In some countries, prosecutors are regularly targeted 
with bribes or bullets. Not so in the United States. That does not work here, because the 
historical independence of American prosecutors keeps them immune from such influences. 
Our highest courts have recognized throughout our history that, like judges, prosecutors 
must be able to do their jobs without fear that a mistake or misunderstanding will subject 
them to efforts to ruin them financially and professionally. The protections of immunity help 
ensure the independence of prosecutors and the judiciary. 
The Historical Basis for Prosecutorial Independence 
The American prosecutor, like so many of our enduring democratic institutions, developed 
as a reaction to systems that favored the rich and powerful. 
The office of the prosecutor grew out of at least three distinct influences. The first was the 
English Attorney General, essentially local advisors for the Crown. The second was the 
Dutch Schout, which was an office that acted as Sheriff but was also vested with prosecution 
powers. The third was the French who made the office of the prosecutor a public office rather 
than a private power. This last influence was most important. 
Before the development of the public prosecutor on the American continent, prosecutors 
were private attorneys who represented the feudal rich in disputes between powers and 
private concerns. Under those systems, prosecutors were hired by each side. They were not 
elected or appointed. The United States recognized the need for an independent elected 
prosecutor who could enforce the law for all members of society rather than the privileged 
few. 
Three factors drove the migration of the office from a private one to a public one: 
1. The notion of a privileged class was rejected and the principles of representative 
government were adopted. No longer were the courts reserved only for the rich to settle 
their private disputes. 
2. There was a shift from centralized powers to local jurisdictions. In those early years of 
the republic, there were real issues concerning the questions of distance and proximity. 
Those on the frontier needed a means to govern effectively without relying on a remote 
government situated days and weeks of travel away. 
3. With an expanding population and geography, there was a public demand for law 
enforcement and public safety. America was young, robust, and growing-public safety 
had to be a priority. Even the most remote settlement needed the rule of law to survive. 
Public safety is still the highest priority of government, both as specified in the state 
constitution and in virtually every survey and poll done of its citizens. Prosperity, education, 
happiness itself (which is an express constitutional objective) depends on public safety. And 
the development of the American prosecutor was directly tied to the need and demand for 
public safety. 
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With the advent of the public prosecutor, the face of the justice system changed. No longer 
was the crime committed only against an individual. The offense was against the state; it 
was an assault on the comfort and safety of all the citizens. As such, society became the 
ultimate victim and the prosecutor's role was to represent society. The actual victim was no 
longer a party to the proceedings, but a witness. The duty of the prosecutor was to carry the 
case forward against the accused on behalf of all the people, not just one individual. In order 
to do that effectively, the prosecutor had to be independent and not subject to private whims 
and vengeful acts of those who disagreed with his or her decisions. 
The first office of a public prosecutor was established in Connecticut in 1704. The statute 
read: 
Hence forth there shall be in every countie a sober, discreet and religious 
person appointed by the Countie Courts to be Atturney for the Queene, 
to prosecute and implead in the lawe all criminal offenders, and to doe all 
other things necessary or convenient as an atturney to suppresse vice and 
immorality. [Original spelling.)11 
Other colonies soon followed. 
In 1828, Andrew Jackson was elected president. His election had a profound influence on the 
development of the independent American prosecutor. During the Jackson administration, 
the movement to decentralize the power of government significantly accelerated. It led to 
the creation of many local offices holding the powers of government, and to those offices 
becoming elective. This movement to locally elected offices included the judiciary. Originally 
the prosecutor's office was a branch of the judiciary. However, with the spread of Jacksonian 
Democracy, the migration of the office of the public prosecutor from the judiciary to the 
executive branch became an irreversible trend. Between 1850 and 1912, all (then 48) states 
established elected prosecutors. All but two (Delaware and Rhode Island) had locally elected 
District Attorneys. 
It is the elective status of local District Attorneys and their historical independence that 
preserves the democratic ideals of our constitution in the justice system. Accountablity 
is indispensable in helping to preserve democracy. Just as the California prosecutor's 
oath of duty is to defend the constitution of the United States and the State of California, 
a prosecutor's loyalty is to the truth and the law. Any action that undermines that 
independence dilutes what is essential to the effectiveness of self-governance. Efforts to 
modify or eliminate the immunity the American prosecutor needs to do his or her job 
without fear damages one of the very foundations on which our justice system depends.12 
Protecting the Independence of the American Prosecutor 
No truly effective justice system can exist unless extraordinary efforts are made to protect 
the independence of the prosecutor. As recognized in the seminal United States Supreme 
Court case of Imbler v. Pachtman, "'The office of the public prosecutor is one which must be 
administered with courage and independence."113 
11. Connecticut (1704) 4 Colonial Records 468, State of Connecticut <http://www.ct.gov/csao/cwp/view. 
asp?a=1795&q=285512> (accessed July 5, 2011). 
12. See Jacoby, Joan E. The American Prosecutor in Historical Context Uacoby served as executive director 
of the Jefferson Institute for Justice Studies, Washington D.C.] and Jon Meacham. American Lion: A 
Biography of President Andrew Jackson. 
13. Imbler v. Pachtman (1976) 424 U.S. 409, 423, quoting Pearson v. Reed (1935) 6 Cal.App. 277, 287. 
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Many interests are continually vying for advantage and supremacy in any society. Those 
interests vary greatly many possess considerable power. The range of interests can span 
the spectrum from great corporations and individuals seeking or protecting wealth to self-
interested persons with a "cause" he or she believes transcends the limits of the law. Some 
are tempted to commit criminal acts. None want to be prosecuted. None want to be held 
accountable for their crimes. To those wishing to operate outside the law, there is great 
danger in an independent prosecutor. From those who view the law as a hindrance to 
their ambitions, there would be great danger to a prosecutor whose independence was not 
protected by the laws of immunities for official acts. 
Without protecting the independence of the prosecutor, every case would be influenced by 
the "apprehension of consequences" for a failure to obtain a conviction. That, in turn, 
"would tend toward great uneasiness and toward weakening the fearless 
and impartial policy which should characterize the administration of this 
office. The work of the prosecutor would thus be impeded, and we would 
have moved away from the desired objective of stricter and fairer law 
enforcement."14 
If a prosecutor (or judge) had to face the risk of financial ruin, harassment by unfounded 
litigation, or even professional disenfranchisement for taking a risk, for trying but failing in a 
prosecution, can it be seriously contended that the time-tested independence of prosecutors 
would not be lost? To take on the rich and powerful would be to risk professional suicide. To 
pursue someone famous and popular-an actor or an athlete who has violated the law, for 
example-would be to invite retaliation, a barrage of lawsuits, and harassment by referrals to 
the Bar Association. 
And, if such harassment can take place for a positive action, it can take place for a negative 
action. Saying "No" to those who want someone prosecuted, whatever their motivations, 
would present its own set of dangers to the prosecutor. Every experienced prosecutor 
has had situations presented in which no one, not sheriff, council member, or police had 
the courage to tell the person pressing the issue that a case was not going to happen. It 
frequently falls to the prosecutor to be the one to say, "No." If that discretion is lost by a 
weakening of a prosecutor's independence, then one can truly hear the death knell of an 
institution vital to the survival of democracy. 
Although the prosecutor ranks are filled by the best and brightest of the legal profession, 
frequently prosecutors enter District Attorney Offices at the beginning of their legal careers. 
The arc of their careers will move them from misdemeanors through low-level felonies and 
on to more serious cases. Each step of the way involves decisions, cases, courts, witnesses, 
evidence, and questions, questions, questions, and more questions. 
Trial work is a prosecutor's life. Some love it; some excel at it; all must do it. And it starts 
in the first weeks of a prosecutor's career and continues unabated until retirement. For trial 
prosecutors, there is little time for reflection. Cases are governed by strict time lines and 
burdens of proof. Even so, the pay and benefits are not as high as many attorneys in private 
practice may earn-a fact that is true not only at the beginning of one's career but continuing 
on for the most senior prosecutor on staff. 
Prosecutors strive to avoid mistakes, but as in all professions, error is inevitable. However, 
these mistakes do not always mean that a defendant was unfairly convicted or that the 
person making the mistake was engaging in intentional misconduct. 
14. I d. at 424, quoting Pearson v. Reed. 
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It is well to remember the prosecutor is not the only professional participating in a criminal 
case. Our system of justice provides a person charged with a crime with the best in defense 
attorneys, and virtually unlimited funds for defense investigators and independent forensic 
testing of evidence. Furthermore, a hardworking, intelligent judiciary provides oversight for 
all cases. And then, after all that, if there is a conviction, there are available multiple levels of 
appellate review for these defendants. 
It is appropriate that these courts of review, some of which are populated by entire panels 
of judges who, along with their law clerks, read and analyze the entire record of a case, 
can conclude that a finding of guilt was not really affected by a minor mistake in the form 
of an argumentative question or an oblique reference to a religious practice in a closing 
argument-and that most mistakes can be corrected. There is such a thing as harmless error. 
The practice of law outside the classroom is indeed a human institution, but our system 
of justice provides many, many layers of protection for a person accused of a crime. 
The prosecutor's role is defined and his or her powers constrained already by the other 
important participants in the criminal justice system. Removing immunity adds nothing to 
the protection of the accused. Adequate protections are already in place. 
And what of that rare time when someone acts badly? 
The 2009 United States Supreme Court in Van de Kamp v. Goldstein referred to a 1949 decision 
to make its point: 
A half-century ago Chief Judge Learned Hand explained that a prosecutor's absolute 
immunity reflects "a balance" of "evils." "[I]t has been thought in the end better," 
he said, "to leave unredressed the wrongs done by dishonest officers than to subject 
those who try to do their duty to the constant dread of retaliation."15 
The NCIP Report ignored the actual holding of Imbler v. Pachtman, and cited instead from a 
minority (concurring) opinion of Justice White for the proposition that prosecutors should 
not enjoy absolute immunity from civil liability when presenting the State's case.16 
The Imbler case itself is an example of how a prosecutor seeking justice would be subjected to 
the constant threat and fear of civil liability without the absolute immunity that the United 
States Supreme Court held to be necessary and well founded in common law. 
Fifteen years after the murder, Imbler was charged, convicted, and sentenced to death. The 
United States Supreme Court heard argument and held that the trial prosecutor could not be 
sued for his actions in prosecuting and convicting Mr. Imbler. 
Imbler sought damages because evidence was brought to light-by the prosecutor-as being 
potentially exculpatory after Imbler's appeals were final. The evidence called into question 
the veracity of one of the four eyewitnesses who identified Imbler as the murderer. An 
evidentiary hearing by the California Supreme Court resulted in this same witness retracting 
his identification and stating that he had not only lied about the identification but also 
embellished his own background to make himself more believable. The California Supreme 
Court unanimously rejected the testimony of the recanting witness and denied the Writ 
of Habeas Corpus. Six years after the denial of the writ by the California Supreme Court, 
15. Van de Kamp v. Goldstein (2009) 555 U.S. 335, quoting Gregoire v. Biddle (1949) 177 F.2d 599, 581. 
16. NCIP Report, supra, at fns. 194 and 195. 
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a Federal District Court granted habeas, which was upheld by the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals. The State of California elected not to retry Imbler on the charges. 
In bringing the habeas to the California Supreme Court, Imbler's attorney stated that the 
prosecutor was an example of "the highest tradition of law enforcement and justice" and 
demonstrated a "devotion to duty."17 In the same brief, Imbler's attorney turned around and 
accused the prosecutor of knowingly soliciting false testimony and suppressing evidence. 
This illogical attack (and divergent factual findings by the State and Federal courts) did not 
escape the High Court's notice when Mr. Imbler later filed suit against the same prosecutor 
for violations of his civil rights under United States Code title 42, section 1983. 
In its holding, the United States Supreme Court confirms the necessity of absolute immunity 
to preserve the public policies protecting the criminal justice system, and the requirement of 
an independent prosecutorial system that is not vulnerable to second guessing by untrained 
lay persons and the animosity of those accused. It did not escape their attention that such 
a policy also served to protect the rights of the accused in the Imbler case. It pointed to the 
facts of the underlying case that gave rise to the section 1983 action to demonstrate that the 
prosecutor might have had significant concern in bringing to light the facts that called into 
question the testimony of one eyewitness. Without immunity, bringing those facts to the 
attention of the courts would have opened him up to civil liability for a case that was closed. 
The Court's rationale for absolute immunity for prosecutors in common law, and as codified 
in statutes, is clearly stated in Imbler: 
Courts that have extended the same immunity to the prosecutor have 
sometimes remarked on the fact that all three officials -judge, grand juror, 
and prosecutor, exercise a discretionary judgment on the basis of evidence 
presented to them. [Citations.] It is the functional comparability of their 
judgments to those of the judge that has resulted in both grand jurors 
and prosecutors being referred to as "quasi-judicial" officers, and their 
immunities being termed "quasi-judicial" as welJ.18 
The office of public prosecutor is one that must be administered with 
courage and independence. Yet how can this be if the prosecutor is made 
subject to suit by those he accuses and fails to convict? To allow this 
would open the way for unlimited harassment and embarrassment of 
the most conscientious officials by those who would profit thereby. There 
would be involved in every case the possible consequences of a failure to 
obtain a conviction. There would always be a question of possible civil 
action in case the prosecutor saw fit to move dismissal of the case .... The 
apprehension of such consequences would tend toward great uneasiness 
and toward weakening the fearless and impartial policy that should 
characterize the administration of this office. The work of the prosecutor 
would thus be impeded, and we would have moved away from the 
desired objective of stricter and fairer law enforcement.19 
17. Imbler, supra, at 413. 
18. I d. at 423, fn. 20. 
19. Id. at 423-424. 
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Over Regulation Can Compromise the Independence of the Prosecutor 
Independence can also be lost by needless regulation. Adding unnecessary training and 
reporting requirements to an already heavy case load is to engage in the same kind of over 
regulation that may sound good in theory but in real life paralyzes action. 
It is not unusual for new regulations and so-called reforms to be offered for any perceived 
problem no matter how rare. Sometimes an aberration leads to an undesirable result. The 
modem reaction is to propound and adopt rules that promise to prevent a reoccurrence. 
However, there are at least three inevitable results to over regulation of prosecutors. The first 
is paralysis because of the fear of consequences. The second is the inevitable compromise 
of effectiveness and the law of unintended consequences; the people harmed the most by 
compromising prosecutorial effectiveness are the victims of crime. The third is that the cost 
of any error will be so prohibitive as to deter all but the wealthy from serving as a district 
attorney. 
LEADERSHIP 
The California prosecutor has a distinguished history of providing leadership. The 
confidence and support of the public is the most important foundation for an effective 
criminal justice system. Time after time, the California prosecutor, in small counties and 
large, have led the charge to bring to justice those who have violated the public trust, 
whether rogue police officer or corrupt politician. At the same time, prosecutors have 
fashioned new methods for ensuring that the most vulnerable in our society, such as children 
and the elderly, are protected and have access to the courts. 
A decade ago, the voters passed the Three Strikes Law and other public safety initiatives by 
overwhelming majorities. Prosecutors heard this call for justice. By aggressively enforcing 
these laws, as enacted by the People and the Legislature, crime in California has been 
reduced. The savings in costs to the criminal justice system of repeatedly re-arresting and 
re-prosecuting career criminals has been immediate and immense. That Californians are 
safer now than they were a decade ago is thanks to the efforts of thousands of prosecutors 
in California. Most importantly, innocent victims have been saved who would have been 
otherwise lost without the strength of prosecutors leading the efforts against incorrigible 
criminals. 
California Prosecutors Have Been Innovative 
Better techniques have been created and pursued by prosecutors-Child Abuse Response 
Teams and Sexual Assault Response Teams; making courts more child friendly; meeting 
the need for sensitive physical examinations of rape victims; and protecting sexual assault 
victims from invasions of privacy. The Victims' Rights movement has been able to look to 
prosecutors to lead efforts for real reform in the justice system that for too long ignored 
victims' rights and was indifferent to the impact of crime on members of the public. In 
similar manner, prosecutors have provided leadership in making courts more accessible to 
minorities and women. 
In pursuit of the value of diversity, District Attorney's Offices in California have been 
providing women and minorities with opportunities to excel in litigation. 
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Other programs like Drug Courts and Veteran's Court have been created and supported by 
prosecutors in order to save the lives of those trapped by addiction or trauma in a revolving 
door of self-destruction. 
New and creative forensic procedures were adopted and led by prosecutors-from Child 
Interview Teams to DNA evidence to providing indisputable evidence of guilt and, where 
appropriate, to clearing the innocent. Without the leadership and expertise of innovative 
prosecutors, it could have been decades later that DNA evidence would be used in actual 
court cases. 
Prosecutors are the leading criminal justice officials in the State of California, and they are 
incredibly effective. Efforts to undermine the effectiveness and authority of prosecutors, such 
as the error-prone NCIP Report, surely hurt individual prosecutors who are doing their job of 
protecting the public-but the ultimate impact is on the safety and well-being of all citizens. 
CLAIMS OF PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT 
Prosecutorial Misconduct-What It Is and What It Is Not 
Under federal law, a prosecutor commits misconduct when his or her conduct 
infects the trial with such unfairness as to make the conviction a denial of 
due process .... Conduct by a prosecutor that does not render a criminal 
trial fundamentally unfair is prosecutorial misconduct under state law 
only if it involves the use of deceptive or reprehensible methods to 
attempt to persuade either the court or the jury." [Emphasis added.)2° 
Minor mistakes and simple errors do not constitute prosecutorial misconduct. 
Making a mistake in how a question is formed in the middle of a trial may be an error, 
but it is not "the use of deceptive or reprehensible methods," and it is not prosecutorial 
misconduct, any more than a judge giving the wrong jury instruction is judicial misconduct. 
In the latter instance, the mistake of the judge is called judicial error, not misconduct. It 
certainly does not open the judge to civil liability and the possible loss of his or her license 
to practice law or the loss of judicial office. The NCIP seemingly would like to impose such 
effects on prosecutors who ask the wrong question or make other minor mistakes even 
though the errors have absolutely no impact on the trial. 
The NCIP Report contends "deceptive or reprehensible" methods were used by prosecutors 
in 707 cases over a period of time that is presented in their title and elsewhere in the report 
as being between 1997 and 200921 but in reality cover a period dating back over a quarter of 
a century. Moreover, the report contends that the conduct in these cases was "deliberate."22 
Both contentions are wrong. 
Federal claims of prosecutorial misconduct, on the other hand, are evaluated from the 
perspective of the defendant's rights and whether those rights were violated; these claims do 
not generally focus on whether the prosecutor's conduct could be considered reprehensible 
20. Hill, supra, at 819, quoting People v. Espinoza (1992) 3 Cal.4th 806, 820, see also Gionis, supra, at 1214 and 
People v. Samayoa (1997) 15 Cal. 4th 795, 841. 
21. NCIP Report at 24. 
22. Id. at 24. 
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or deceptive, or whether the conduct was intentional.23 Whether the prosecutor acts with 
any bad faith or nefarious intent is generally irrelevant to an analysis of prosecutorial 
misconduct under federallaw. 24 Most serious commentators accept that the correct 
terminology, in instances where neither bad faith nor deceptive conduct is involved, is 
"error," not "misconduct."25 
One of the most misleading claims made by the NCIP Report is that courts "explicitly'' 
found prosecutorial misconduct in more than 700 cases where a court, analyzing a claim of 
prosecutorial misconduct, found the prosecutor erred in some way. A court's finding that 
a prosecutor erred, by itself, is not a finding of prosecutorial misconduct, even if the court 
makes such a finding when examining a prosecutorial misconduct claim. It simply does 
not meet the legal definition under either state or federal law. As such, the NCIP Report 
is actually a compilation of cases where prosecutors "erred," not a study of "prosecutorial 
misconduct." 
A striking example is the California Supreme Court's decision in People v. Chatman.Z6 The 
NCIP Report held this decision up as a case in which a court found a prosecutor had 
committed prosecutorial misconduct, but, in fact, the court ruled harmless error.27 
In Chatman, the defense alleged that the prosecutor had committed prosecutorial misconduct 
by intentionally asking a defendant questions that would elicit inadmissible evidence.28 
While it may have been clear to the authors of the NCIP Report that this was an instance of 
misconduct, it certainly was not clear to the California Supreme Court. The first thing the 
court did was to note, 
[W]e question whether this issue is properly considered one of 
misconduct. "Although it is misconduct for a prosecutor intentionally 
to elicit inadmissible testimony [citation], merely eliciting evidence is 
not misconduct. Defendant's real argument is that the evidence was 
inadmissible."29 
The court then added, "[N]othing in the record suggests [the prosecutor] sought to present 
evidence he knew was inadmissible, especially given that the court overruled defendant's 
objections and, as discussed below, the applicable law was unsettled at the time of trial."30 
However, the court then went on to say, 
23. People v. Bolton (1979) 23 Cal.3d 208, 213-214; Hill, supra, at 822-823. 
24. Id. 
25. See e.g., American Bar Association Recommendation 100B, adopted August 9-10, 2010 <http://www. 
americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/leadership/2010/annual/pdfs/lOOb.authcheckdam.pdf> (accessed 
July 6, 2011). 
26. People v. Chatman (2006) 38 Cal.4th 344. 
27. Id.; NCIP Report, Appendix B: Harmless Cases by Jurisdiction: 111. 
28. Chatman, supra, at 379. 
29. Id. at 379-380, emphasis in original, quoting People v. Bonin (1988) 46 Cal.3d 659, 689 and People v. Scott 
(1997) 15 Cal.4th 1188, 1218. 
30. I d. at 380. 
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[W]hether we label the issue misconduct or the erroneous admission of 
evidence does not greatly matter, for defendant's argument is essentially 
identical under either characterization. Because the cases generally 
discuss the issue under the rubric of misconduct, we will do so also.31 
The Chatman court then examined the defendant's litany of claims of prosecutorial 
misconduct in determining whether the evidence was properly admitted. The court rejected 
all of the defendant's contentions that the prosecutor's questions were improper.32 
The court did, however, thoroughly discuss argumentative questions and found a question 
asked by the prosecutor was, in fact, argumentative.33 The defendant had not objected to 
the question when asked, however, so he was precluded from challenging this question on 
appeal.34 
This case is the NCIP Report in a nutshell. Numerous claims of prosecutorial misconduct are 
made, but when they are analyzed one by one, they are found not to be misconduct at all. 
Even the one question found (after much lawyerly discussion) to have been argumentative 
does not turn out to have been serious enough to have solicited even an objection from the 
defense attorney. So its impact on the trial was non-existent. For even such a minor mistake 
in the form of a question, the NCIP Report would apparently subject prosecutors to the 
possibility of being sued, having their names published in some sort of public condemnation 
procedure or their careers investigated by the Bar Association. 
This case, which was relied upon by the NCIP as a case in which the court explicitly found 
prosecutorial misconduct, is a far cry from the "deceptive and unfair tactics" the NCIP claims 
their study shows are being used to obtain convictions.35 No explicit finding of prosecutorial 
misconduct was ever made. The finding would more appropriately be termed a minor 
"prosecutorial error." 
Confusing Brady Error with Prosecutorial Misconduct 
Additionally, the NCIP Report designates, as prosecutorial misconduct, instances where a 
prosecutor failed to disclose exculpatory evidence-" Brady error."36 A Brady violation occurs 
when evidence favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory or because it is 
impeaching, is either willfully or intentionally suppressed by the state and, as a result, the 
accused suffers prejudice.37 While willfully withholding exculpatory evidence constitutes 
Brady error, so does the inadvertent failure to disclose the evidence.38 Moreover, the 
prosecutor's duty to turn over exculpatory evidence "extends even to evidence known only 
to police investigators and not to the prosecutor."39 
31. Id. 
32. ld.at380-383. 
33. I d. at 384. 
34. Id. at 384, fn. 14. 
35. NCIP Report at v. 
36. NCIP Report at 25; Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83. 
37. Strickler v. Greene (1999) 527 U.S. 263, 281-282. 
38. People v. Salazar (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1031, 1043. 
39. Id. at 1042. 
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Brady error can occur despite the best intentions of the prosecutor, if the police investigators 
have evidence and fail to disclose that evidence to the prosecutor. 
Not every discovery violation amounts to prosecutorial misconduct either. For instance, 
in People v. Hicks,40 a case relied on in the NCIP Report as a case where a court "explicitly" 
found misconduct, the court actually explicitly stated the failure to timely disclose 
information did not amount to prejudicial misconduct. 
In Hicks, a narcotics sales case, the defendant complained that the prosecutor's discovery 
had not put him on notice that an officer would testify that the defendant had hand-to-hand 
contact with a party that the prosecutor theorized had provided the narcotics. After he was 
convicted, the defendant appealed, claiming prejudicial prosecutor misconduct. 
The court of appeal rejected that argument, concluding the prosecutor erred by failing to 
ensure compliance with the discovery provisions of Penal Code sections 1054 et seq., but 
found any error harmless. The court noted that the prosecution's theory obviously included 
the transfer of the narcotics and a marked $20 bill between the defendant and the suspect 
party, and other evidence conclusively showed the bill had been transferred. 
The court never expressly made a finding of misconduct. First, there is no indication in 
the case as to what specifically the statement was and whether or not the statement was in 
the possession of the prosecutor or just the officer. More importantly, however, the court 
expressly stated "even assuming that the prosecutor's failure to disclose [the officer's] 
statement amounted to misconduct ... we find any misconduct harmless." Yet the report 
relies on this case as one in which the court expressly found misconduct. The NCIP Report on 
this case, as well as numerous others, is clearly misleading and contrary to what the court 
actually held. 
Confusing Batson/Wheeler Errors with Prosecutorial Misconduct 
The NCIP Report also includes cases it classifies as prosecutorial misconduct that are Batson/ 
Wheeler1 error, not misconduct. These are cases in which courts granted a Batson/Wheeler 
motion brought against a prosecutor, a motion that requires a court to make a finding 
that the prosecutor impermissibly used a perceived group bias to exercise a peremptory 
challenge to exclude a juror. 
The process of a Batson/Wheeler motion is quite simple. First an attorney raises a challenge 
that a party is using peremptory challenges in an impermissible manner. Then the court 
must decide if the challenging party has raised a colorable claim. If so, the party being 
challenged must then rebut the claim that the challenges are being exercised impermissibly 
by explaining the actual reasons he or she excused the perspective juror. The court resolves 
any factual disputes and makes a final decision of whether the peremptory challenges were 
exercised in a permissible manner.42 
40. People v. Hicks, 2005 WL 1671814. Listed in the NCIP Report at 112. 
41. Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79 and People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258. 
42. People v. Lenix (2008) 44 Cal.4th 602, 612. 
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The law in this area has been unsettled for a number of years, and courts themselves do not 
always agree on what is Batson/Wheeler error and what is the requisite proof of its existence. 
Historically, when challenges where made to the trial court's ruling on appeal, the trial 
court's factual determinations were given great deference.43 
More recently, however, courts have held that when a defendant's Batson/Wheeler motion is 
denied and the defendant challenges the ruling on appeal, the appellate courts must make 
a comparison of the reasons given by the prosecutor to excuse certain jurors to other jurors 
who were not excused-to decide if the reasons were genuine or pretextual. Where a juror is 
excused for a stated reason by a prosecutor, but another juror with a similar characteristic is 
not excused, appellate courts are instructed to consider this as evidence that the prosecutor's 
stated reason was inadequate. This comparison must be done by the appellate court even 
when the comparison was not done by the trial court.44 
On appeal, however, the appellate court has only the record of what happened in the 
trial court. Where an appellate court is addressing an argument that was not raised in the 
trial court, the record is often not fully developed, leaving the appellate court at a distinct 
disadvantage to review the factual decision of the trial court. For this very reason, the 
California Supreme Court had rejected this type of analysis before the United States Supreme 
Court required it.45 Because of the possibility of an undeveloped record, the California 
Supreme Court noted that engaging in comparative juror analysis for the first time on appeal 
was unreliable.46 
In the past, when the reason underlying a prosecutor's decision to excuse one juror but 
keep another was neither raised as an issue in the trial court nor brought to the prosecutor's 
attention, it should surprise no one that the prosecutor did not tend to make an adequate 
record of the reason. Now the United States Supreme Court requires this type of comparative 
analysis on appeal, and the California Supreme Court has noted, "[b ]oth court and counsel 
bear responsibility for creating a record that allows for meaningful review."47 The rules have 
finally been made clearer. The fact that a prosecutor failed in the past to keep more detailed 
records is not cause to accuse him or her of misconduct. 
Even panels of Supreme Court Justices have disagreed on how the law is to be applied in 
this area, and the case law and precedent changes, as it often does. Mistakes of this kind are 
simply not prosecutorial misconduct. 
The NCIP Report's repeated failure to properly identify what is and what is not prosecutorial 
misconduct can be traced to a lack of the use of basic academic standards in its study. 
43. Hernandez v. New York (1991) 500 U.S. 352, 364-365. 
44. Snyder v. Louisiana (2008) 552 U.S. 472; Lenix, supra, at 607. 
45. People v. Johnson (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1302, 1318, 1324. 
46. Id. 
47. Lenix, supra, at 621. 
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THE NCIP REPORT LACKED LEGAL OR 
ACADEMIC STANDARDS 
Another disturbing aspect of the NCIP Report is the lack of academic standards adhered 
to in the research attending the project. Although the NCIP Report was issued under the 
auspices of a putative academic institution and purports to establish statistical truths, it 
becomes clear under analysis that it is full of errors and mistakes. What is equally clear is 
that the failure to adhere to any conventional standards in the research that went into this 
report caused much of the inaccuracy. 
The errors in the NCIP Report cover the entire spectrum from the misidentification of parties 
and cases to factual inaccuracy and the misreading of legal opinions. As shown below, the 
report does not meet the most basic standard to be admissible in a court of law. Although 
the report contains a chapter titled "methodology," there is no discussion of checking for 
mistakes or of random samples being examined for accuracy. Adequately documented 
details about where the purported facts come from and who is responsible for them is not 
mentioned so as to allow for objective peer review. 
One of the most significant failures of the NCIP Report is that the prosecutors themselves 
were never consulted. The very subjects of the report were never invited to provide 
clarifying information or context, or to contribute to the discussion. 
The NCIP Report's Use of Statistics 
These academic failures are apparent in what passes for analysis in the report, and are 
accompanied by statistics that seem impressive until one examines the contentions more 
objectively. 
A chief deputy district attorney from Sacramento summarized the statistical sleight-of-hand 
played by NCIP: 
Like the mythical shepherd boy in the Boy Who Cried Wolf, the Northern 
California Innocence Project report on prosecutorial misconduct in California48 
rails at a problem that simply does not exist. In the NCIP's First Annual Report, 
an addendum to the original study, the authors would have you believe that 
prosecutorial misconduct is underreported, under-investigated by the state bar, and 
hidden from public view because of a lack of transparency.49 The reality. however, is 
that Californians have every reason to have faith in the administration of criminal 
justice in this state, and should be proud of their elected and appointed prosecutors. 
The Innocence Project presents their argument without placing the facts in a 
proper context. The report states that their search of criminal cases in California 
between 1997 and 2010 found 800 cases of prosecutorial misconduct,50 resulting 
in 202 cases "where convictions were reversed, mistrials declared, or evidence 
48. See fn. 3. 
49. See generally, NCIP First Annual Report at 16-17. 
50. Id. at 17. 
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barred. "51 Presumably, the other 598 cases did not require a reversal, mistrial, or 
evidence exclusion as the reviewing court found justice had not been denied. 
Initially, the public needs to understand that prosecutorial misconduct can take 
many forms and can take place at any stage of a criminal case, from the initial 
investigation until final judgment. 52 One cannot gain an appreciation of the scope 
of the issue without understanding the vast number of cases prosecuted yearly in 
California, each carrying with it the potential for prosecutorial misconduct. This 
complete failure by the Innocence Project to place the cases they cite within a proper 
context is an embarrassingly unprofessional lapse by the authors. 
Take a look at the number of persons arrested only for felonies53 in the available 
statistics between 1997 and 2009. A review of the numbers shows an average of 
308,632 felony arrests per year. 54 Prosecutorial misconduct could occur at any time 
after this stage55 but to again lessen the numbers in favor of the Innocence Project, 
let us only examine those felony arrests that actually result in filed charges, or 
approximately 256,000 per year. 56 To skew these numbers in favor of the Innocence 
Project even further, this author will not count federal prosecutions in California, 
but rather now we are limiting this response only to felony arrests that resulted in 
criminal charges being filed in state court. 57 
The Innocence Project examined criminal cases between 1997 and 2010.58 The 
report does not indicate that misdemeanor or federal prosecutions were eliminated 
from their inquiry. In that 14-year period of time, approximately 3,584,000 felony 
cases were filed in state courts throughout California. In these roughly 3.5 million 
cases, the Innocence Project found 800 cases of "prosecutorial misconduct." In 
mathematical terms, this means that prosecutorial misconduct occurred in only 
.022 percent of all criminal cases. In layman's terms, this means that one case of 
prosecutorial misconduct occurred in every 4,480 felony criminal cases in state 
courts. 59 
Consider also that prosecutorial misconduct can be fixed, often by the trial court when it 
happens or is identified, or later by an appellate court. All California criminal cases are 
subject to stringent review: by individual prosecuting offices statewide that police themselves 
through training and quality control, by trial court judges, by appellate court judges, and by 
the state bar. 
51. Id. at 16. 
52. See David Sherman. "Defining Prosecutorial Misconduct" (Spring 2011) 33 CDAA Prosecutor's Brief 
3:20. 
53. This response will just concentrate on felony cases in California. The reader should be mindful of 
the fact, however, that prosecutorial misconduct can also occur in misdemeanors, and since more 
misdemeanors occur in California than felonies, using only these numbers is an advantage to the 
skewed implications of the Innocence Project. 
54. California Department of Justice statistics, Table 37, Dispositions of Adult Felony Arrests, 1975-2009. 
55. E.g. in an investigative search warrant, in questioning of suspects and witnesses by prosecutors or their 
agents, or violations of the rule of law cited in Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83. 
56. Derived by subtracting the number of law enforcement releases and the number of complaints denied 
from the average yearly felony arrest number of 308,632. 
57. Adding in misdemeanors and federal prosecutions would more then double the numbers in the 
universe of cases where prosecutorial misconduct could occur in California. 
58. NCIP First Annual Report at 17. 
59. Consider that your odds of the earth suffering a cataclysmic collision with an asteroid in the next 100 
years is one in 5,000 <www.funny2.com/odds.htm> (accessed July 6, 2011). 
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The real question that should be asked here is not, "Why is there so much prosecutorial 
misconduct in California?" Instead, it should be, "Why is there so little prosecutorial 
misconduct in California?" The answer, of course, is that California's prosecutors are highly-
trained professionals with a passion for justice, wherever justice may take them. Prosecutors 
operate under stringent standards, embracing the recognition that doing their job correctly 
requires them to do it ethically and honorably. 
A senior prosecutor holding a supervising position in the Tulare County District Attorney's 
Office pointed out that the NCIP Report unsuccessfully attempted to parlay a lack of 
statistics regarding State Bar action against prosecutors into a perceived failure of the 
California Bar Association-when nothing could be further from the truth: 
With a total of six cases of public discipline for prosecutors handling criminal 
cases in close to 13 years of reporting, it would seem like the clear statement by 
the California State Bar is that prosecutors have held themselves to a much higher 
standard than is the practice for the remaining members of the Bar (who totaled 
4,736 cases of public discipline over that same time frame). 
Rather than interpreting the numbers as a monument to the integrity of the public 
prosecutor, the NCIP Report demands quota-style discipline. At the same time, it 
fails to recognize that the vast number of publically reported cases have nothing to 
do with courtroom practice. An overwhelming number were found to be breaches in 
the disciplined attorney's fiduciary duties. Failure to comply with mandated actions 
by the State Bar and convictions for crimes of moral turpitude come in a distant 
second and third as a basis for discipline. 
The NCIP Report claims only six prosecutors have been publicly disciplined for 
handling criminal cases out of 4,741 cases from January 1997 to September 2009 
(or 12-and-a-half year's worth of cases). The inference is that 4,735 criminal defense 
attorneys were sanctioned for misconduct relating to the defense of their client while 
similar conduct by prosecutors was simply ignored by the State Bar. 
A review of the California Lawyer Discipline Report found online June 6, 
2011, listed 102 attorneys who were named as having received some form of public 
discipline between April-June 2011. Discipline ranged from Public Reproval 
(10), Probation (14), Suspensions (51), and Resignations (10) to a report of27 
attorneys who were Disbarred. (See Table on page 24.) 
Of the 10 cases where the State Bar chose Public Reproval, only one involved 
misconduct in handling a criminal defense. This one case was the only one out of 
the 102 cases where attorneys were found to have committed misconduct in the 
course of a criminal defense. This particular criminal defense attorney directed his 
investigator to interview a co-defendant without authorization of the co-defendant's 
attorney. The other nine cases of Public Reproval were the result of five convictions 
(jour for multiple DU!s in association with accidents and one for an assault with 
a stun gun); four cases involving a breach of fiduciary duties; and, finally, a single 
case where an attorney threatened a State Bar action against opposing counsel in 
order to gain advantage in a civil dispute (there was also a beach of fiduciary duty 
for failing to file motions timely in this particular case). 
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In addition, 14 attorneys were placed on Probation for misconduct. Of the 14 
cases, eight were for a breach of fiduciary duty, with one compounding the breach by 
providing false information to a lien holder; three were for convictions (two cases of 
multiple DUis, one relating to a conviction for failing to pay income tax); and the 
final three for failing to comply with the State Bar disciplinary procedure. 
Fifty-one attorneys were Suspended for misconduct: 31 for a breach of fiduciary 
duty; seven for criminal convictions; 10 for failure to comply with prior disciplinary 
actions of the State Bar; four for misconduct in the civil practice of law; one for 
improper interaction with the State Bar (in addition to a breach of fiduciary duties 
in that particular case); and one for prosecutorial misconduct (this was the only 
prosecutor who received any form of public discipline). 
Of the 27 attorneys who were reported to have been Disbarred during this period, 
18 failed in their fiduciary duties; six Jailed to comply with orders of the State Bar in 
prior attempts to discipline; three were disbarred following convictions for crimes of 
moral turpitude (child molest, grand theft, interstate fraud); and one was disbarred 
for a misrepresentation of his firm (a sole practitioner claiming to be a member of a 
10-lawyer firm) and his relationship with loan officers and ability to ensure clients 
would get loans. 
The motivations that drive intentional actions requiring public discipline simply do 
not exist for the public prosecutor since the public prosecutor is not in the business 
of making a profit and cannot increase his or her income by the various forms of 
larceny that constitute the basis of a vast majority of misconduct subject to State Bar 
discipline. 
State Bar Discipline Report (April-June 2011) 
PR Prob Susp Disbarment Total 
Breach of Fiduciary Duty 4* 8* 31* 18 61* 
Criminal Convictions 5 3 7 3 18 
Failure to Comply with State Bar 0 3 10* 5 18* 
Improper Interaction with Bar 0 0 1* 0 1* 
Misconduct in Civil Practice 1* 1* 4 1 7* 
Misconduct in a Criminal Defense 1 0 0 0 1 
Misconduct in Prosecution of Case 0 0 1 0 1 
Total Cases 10* 14* 51* 27 102 
*Multiple categories of discipline 
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The NCIP Report, Were It Offered into Evidence, Would be Rejected in a Court of Law 
Science that is based in faulty facts and procedures and promotes specialized interests 
and individual agendas is commonly referred to as "junk science." Because bad science 
may lurk behind even impressive degrees, courts hold gate-keeper hearings to prevent the 
introduction of unreliable science into the deliberations and judgments of courts and juries.60 
Principled experts do not make conclusions admissible of their own accord. A statement 
such as, "I say I am an expert, therefore, what I say must be true" does not meet the 
foundational requirements for consideration as evidence in a court of law. 
The authors of the NCIP Report maintain expert status; however, there is nothing in 
the report that establishes their expertise in the field of law. There are no qualifications 
proffered that entitle them to speak with authority on the matters of prosecutorial procedure, 
evidence, trial advocacy, judicial review, or any of the subjects their report covers. 
Federal Rule of Evidence section 702 and the Kumho Tire case, as well as Daubert v. Merrell 
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 61 establish the standard for the admissibility of studies such as the 
NCIP Report. Before considering testimony, the court decides if the scientific theory I method 
relied upon by a party (1) has been peer reviewed; (2) has a low error rate; (3) is testable; and 
(4) is generally accepted in the scientific community. 
By adopting peer review as a benchmark for legal acceptance of scientific knowledge, the 
court validated the idea that science must be of sound, independently reviewed, unbiased 
methodology before it can be real science, and it also agreed that the only cure for bad 
science is vigorous cross-examination. 
Nowhere in the NCIP Report has peer review been mentioned. The NCIP's stated mission 
is clearly biased to favor the defense. The error rate for the report is extremely high. The 
methodolgy is not detailed enough to be "testable": It fails to meet minimum legal standards 
of reliability. 
THE NCIP REPORT CONSISTENTLY MISREPORTED 
CASE HOLDINGS AND FINDINGS 
The authors of the NCIP Report never contacted the subjects of their research to make the 
most basic inquiries. They did not call the prosecutors they accused of malfeasance or the 
District Attorney's Offices that prosecuted the cases they cited. These failures contributed to 
an erroneous report. 
Equally disturbing is how often the holdings and findings in cases were incorrectly 
represented. Patterns of incorrect information appear to be clear, and the misrepresentations 
of cases seems intentional and meant to paint a false picture of the incidence of prosecutorial 
misconduct. 
60. Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael (1999) 526 U.S. 137, 153. 
61. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (1993) 509 U.S. 579, 597. 
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Misrepresentations About the Sodersten Case 
In the executive summary of the report, the first case discussed was the Sodersten62 case. 
The authors contend that the case involved prosecutorial misconduct and that an appellate 
court found that this "misconduct" resulted in an innocent man dying in prison. The court 
transcript establishes that nothing could be further from the truth. 
The Sodersten case did not involve prosecutorial misconduct, and no court, neither the 
trial court nor the appellate court, found that Sodersten was innocent. The court of appeal 
expressly noted, "We do not know-and need not determine- whether petitioner killed 
Julie Wilson."63 
The selection of the Sodersten case for inclusion in the summary was itself strange. In a very 
real sense, the emphasis on this case undermines the arguments for "reform" advocated by 
the authors of the report. 
To discuss Sodersten, the authors had to go outside the stated time period the report was 
supposed to cover, and reach back more than a quarter of a century to a trial that took place 
in 1984. But even here, the NCIP authors chose the wrong case. 
The following facts are glossed over or, worse, ignored in the report. 
1. There was never a finding of prosecutorial misconduct in the Sodersten case by either the 
trial court or the appellate court. The court of appeal noted, "[W]hether the nondisclosure 
was intentional is immaterial, and we do not decide that question."64 The August 23, 
2004, Tulare County court case denying the habeas petition found: "It is the view of this 
court that petitioner has failed to establish willful misconduct by the prosecution,"65 and 
"This court is unable to discern a pattern of willful failure to provide discovery or the ... 
tapes." 66 
Even a cursory look at the trial record would have found that the case did not involve 
prosecutorial misconduct. In fact, none of the headnotes in the official reports cite 
prosecutorial misconduct as being involved in the case. 
The trial court held two lengthy habeas hearings 18 years after the trial, and issued 
written rulings that confirmed that not only was there no prosecutorial misconduct, but 
the evidence allegedly not turned over to the defense would have harmed-not helped-
the defense. 
Nowhere in the rather lengthy appellate decision is a finding that the prosecutor engaged 
in any misconduct. And even though the superior court found no misconduct and the 
appellate court found no misconduct, according to the NCIP Report, the authors decided 
to highlight the case as a "stark example."67 
62. In re Sodersten (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 1163; see also fn. 73 of this paper. 
63. Id. at 1236. 
64. Id. at 1226. 
65. Tulare County Superior Court Case # 39404, Ruling Denying the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 
(August 23, 2004) 3. 
66. I d. at 4. 
67. It would appear that the Sodersten defense attorney was consulted, although the prosecutor was never 
contacted by the authors. 
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2. Regarding the Sodersten case, the NCIP Report cites, as proof of prosecutor misconduct, 
two tapes as being intentionally withheld despite the fact the appellate court 
acknowledged these tapes were not known to the prosecutor or his investigator. The 
court of appeal noted, "[E]ven Cline and his investigator were unaware of them." 68 These 
were police tapes found years later in a police file. Some of the strongest language of the 
appellate court decision is used regarding this evidence. 
This fact was never mentioned in the NCIP Report. 
3. The prosecutors involved have consistently maintained over the years that the other 
two tapes (of court-familiarity sessions with a minor witness) were actually turned over 
to the defense, and that the cross-examination of the witness by the defense attorney 
showed he had the tapes. The defense attorney, during the trial, referred to where and 
when the familiarity sessions occurred in his cross-examination.69 Unfortunately, decades 
after the trial, the documentation that the tapes were turned over could not be provided. 
So the courts, based upon a lack of documentary proof, were compelled to find that the 
tapes had not been received. Should failure to document the delivery of discovery in a 
25-year-old case be labeled misconduct? Clearly no reasonable person could do so. And 
no one did. 
The appellate court, in accepting the superior court's finding that the defendant never 
received any of the tapes, characterized this as a "neglected or ignored" duty and a 
"dereliction of ... duty by law enforcement and prosecutorial authorities." 70 The court 
made clear that the lack of discovery was a systemic failure and that the defendant 
"most certainly did not receive a fair trial."71 Strong language. But while these words 
clearly condemn the underlying conduct as unacceptable, the appellate court did not 
find that it rose to the level of prosecutorial misconduct, as discussed above. 
4. The trial court found that the tapes would have hurt the defense, not helped them. The 
appellate court went to great lengths to establish the materiality of the tapes, but if one 
is going to hold this case up as prime example of the innocent being imprisoned, should 
not it at least have been mentioned that the actual trial judge, who had heard all the 
testimony in the trial and then heard all the testimony in both habeas proceedings, found 
just the opposite? 
In point of fact, the judge who presided over the trial, and then 18 years later heard 
all the habeas proceedings and the motions concerning the missing tapes, specifically 
found that evidence of the defendant's guilt was so overwhelming, a jury would have 
convicted him anyway.72 
What is clear is that the authors of the NCIP Report appear to accept the representations of a 
biased party, Sodersten' s defense lawyer, without including the case decision, much less the 
entire record of the case. The NCIP attacks on District Attorney Phil Cline were exaggerated 
and unfair. 
68. Sodersten, supra, at 1224. 
69. Id. 
70. Id. at 1218, 1236. 
71. Id. at 1218, 1219. 
72. Tulare County Superior Court Case #39404 Second Order Denying Petition, 3. 
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The authors of the NCIP Report failed to contact the prosecutors about any of the cases they 
cited. This was a grievous oversight. Had the authors been more interested in the truth, they 
would have at least asked about the details underlying cases before reaching a conclusion. 
Reporters from legal papers contacted many of the prosecutors so carelessly named in the 
report, including the Sodersten prosecutor. When they did, they found out the truth.73 
But Phil Cline is not the only one unfairly maligned by the NCIP. Countless other prosecutors 
have been singled out and accused of misconduct when none occurred. 
73. The following is the factual context of the 1984 Sodersten case, which involved the brutal rape and 
murder of a young mother witnessed by her two children, both under age five: The case was 
assigned to the prosecutor a month before trial in 1986. He had been a prosecutor about six years. It 
was being handled up until then by another prosecutor who eventually was appointed to the bench 
where he honorably served for more than 20 years until he retired. He currently still hears cases on 
assignment. In preparing for trial, the young prosecutor conducted practice sessions with a five-year-
old girl witness. The sessions where done in a courtroom so she could understand how court worked. 
Ironically, the prosecutor had the sessions taped specifically so he could prove nothing improper 
occurred during the interviews. In fact there was no other reason to tape the interviews. The prosecutor 
has always maintained that the tapes were turned over to the defense, but by the time of the habeas 
proceedings, 18 years later, did not have documentary proof that he did so. One possible reason he did 
not, is that a quarter-century ago, when the events occurred, in many counties the policy for document 
discovery turnovers was informal. The prosecution just gave the defense everything it had. For these 
prosecutors, it was the simplest of policies, or so they thought. Few would be so trusting in this day 
and age. Years later, another defense attorney who had brought a habeas proceeding was given full 
access to the prosecution file, as is usually done, and he ended up contending that those two tapes 
were not received by the original defense attorney. 
The authors of the NCIP Report failed to read the trial transcripts or written motions concerning 
these tapes. Had they done so, they would have discovered that the original defense attorney 
(disbarred in 2000), in cross-examination of the minor, actually referred to the interview sessions and 
where they occurred. This was very significant proof that the tapes had indeed been turned over. 
In the opinion of the trial judge, it is likely that the defense knew the tapes would hurt his case 
rather than help it, and that is the reason he never played them for the jury. However, because the 
prosecution had no documentation in the decades-old file that the tapes were turned over, the trial 
court found in the habeas proceedings held years later that they had not been received by the defense. 
There were two other tapes, the so-called "Lester Williams" tapes, which were made surreptitiously 
by police officers and were found years later in a police file. As previously indicated, even the appellate 
court acknowledged that neither the prosecutor nor his investigator knew of the existence of these 
tapes. Yet these two tapes were more central to the appellate decision than the child's tapes. 
In 2004, two lengthy habeas hearings concerning all four tapes were heard in superior court 
by the judge who had presided over the trial 18 years earlier. He specifically found there was no 
intentional withholding of the tapes from the defense. He specifically found there was no prosecutorial 
misconduct. He went on to reject the opinion of a defense expert who listened to the tapes 12 years or 
so after they were made and opined that the girl's testimony was unduly tainted by how the sessions 
were conducted. He further found that if the tapes had been used by the defense they would have hurt, 
not helped, the defense. He pointed out how much emphasis the prosecutor put into telling the child 
witness to tell the truth. He denied the habeas writs. 
In 2007, the appellate court issued a ruling that made findings in contravention of the rulings of the 
trial judge. At this point, they were looking back at a case more than 20 years old, and clearly intended 
to substitute the judgment of the trial judge with their own. They can do so, and they did. And clearly, 
they were disturbed by the finding that the defense never had any of the FOUR tapes, and they 
disagreed with the trial court over their materiality. Still, one cannot just ignore the findings of the trial 
judge who heard all the evidence both at trial and in the habeas proceedings. In fact, his ruling is more 
persuasive as to materiality and is very convincing that this person would have been convicted by a 
jury in any event. 
And one certainly cannot ignore there was never any evidence that anything was ever intentionally 
withheld from the defense, and that prosecutorial misconduct was never an element in this case. 
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Results of a Sampling of Cases Cited in the NCIP Report 
Prosecutorial Misconduct: Federal Law 
Under federal law, a prosecutor commits misconduct when his or her conduct, willful or not, 
with knowledge or not, '"infects the trial with such unfairness as to make the conviction a 
denial of due process."'74 
Prosecutorial Misconduct: State Law 
Conduct by a prosecutor that does not render a criminal trial fundamentally unfair is 
prosecutorial misconduct under state law only if it involves '"the use of deceptive or 
reprehensible methods to attempt to persuade either the court or the jury."'75 
As noted above, and elsewhere in this document, state and federal courts use a specified 
standard of review to determine whether prosecutorial misconduct has in fact occurred. The 
NCIP Report lists a significant number of cases where the above state and federal definitions 
of misconduct were clearly not met. 
Significantly, according to the NCIP Report, in 548 of the 707 cases of alleged misconduct, 
state and federal magistrates found that no injustice occurred and upheld the convictions. 
The analysis portion of the report purports to have identified 707 cases where courts 
specifically "found" that prosecutors had committed misconduct.76 The 707 cases are 
listed by jurisdiction in the report under Appendix A, Harmful Cases by Jurisdiction, and 
Appendix B, Harmless Cases by Jurisdiction. 
The NCIP analysis lists examples out of the purported 707 cases where courts had explicitly 
found prosecutorial misconduct. Out of the 548 cases in Appendix B that the report lists as 
carrying a finding of prosecutorial misconduct, 11 cases are listed as examples of harmless 
cases where the courts nevertheless found misconduct. The remaining 537 cases are simply 
listed by case citation (or newspaper name and date) and jurisdiction without further 
reference or analysis to specific misconduct findings. 
A mere sampling of the 707 cases from various counties raises concern as to the validity of 
the report's blanket assertions. 
People v. Massey: No Misconduct Found 
(Cited in NCIP Report, Appendix B: Harmless Cases by Jurisdiction.) 
In People v. Massey/7 a jury had found that the defendant was a sexually violent predator. 
He was committed to the custody of the California Department of Mental Health pursuant 
to the Sexually Violent Predators Act. On appeal, the defendant argued that the prosecution 
committed misconduct when, during examination, the prosecutor asked the defendant if the 
victims had been lying. The Massey court analyzed the purported misconduct under both 
state and federal definitions listed above. The court affirmed the judgment: 
74. Hill, supra, at 819, quoting Gionis, supra, at 1214; Espinoza, supra, at 820. 
75. Id., quoting Espinoza, supra, at 820; Samayoa, supra, at 841. 
76. NCIP Report at 16. 
77. People v. Massey 2005 WL 775869. 
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• "[D]efendant claims these questions constitute misconduct because "[i]t 
is improper for [a] prosecutor to cross examine a defendant on whether a 
prosecution witness has lied." 
• "Although the questions were improper, it does not necessarily flow that the 
prosecution committed misconduct." 
• "[W]e find no prosecutorial misconduct." 
People v. Hutto: Questions on Defendant's Custodial Status, While Improper, Were 
Not Misconduct Warranting Mistrial 
(Cited in NCIP Report, Appendix B: Harmless Cases by Jurisdiction.) 
In People v. Hutto/8 Defendant Hutto appealed his jury conviction contending, among other 
assertions, that the prosecutor committed misconduct by eliciting information regarding 
his custodial status. Noting the prosecutor's inquiry as brief and isolated, the Hutto 
court analyzed the misconduct allegation under both the state and federal definition of 
misconduct. With the exception of striking Hutto's prior prison enhancement, the judgment 
was affirmed. 
• "A prosecutor's intemperate behavior violates the Federal Constitution when 
it comprises a pattern of conduct so egregious that it infects the trial with 
such unfairness as to make the conviction a denial of due process. Conduct 
by a prosecutor that does not render a criminal trial fundamentally unfair is 
prosecutorial misconduct under state law only if it involves the use of deceptive 
or reprehensible methods to persuade either the court or the jury." 
• "[T]he [prosecutor's] brief questions regarding Hutto's custodial status did not 
create the potential for impairment of the presumption of innocence that might 
arise were such information repeatedly conveyed to the jury." 
• "To the extent Hutto claims that prosecutorial misconduct occurred in violation 
of federal due process, we perceive none on this record which would have warranted 
the grant of a mistrial." [Emphasis added.] 
People v. Fanady: Questions Not Characterized as Prosecutorial Misconduct 
(Cited in NCIP Report, Appendix B: Harmless Cases by Jurisdiction.) 
In People v. Fanady/9 the defendant was convicted of crimes arising from committing sexual 
acts on young boys. Fanady appealed, alleging that the prosecutor committed misconduct 
when asking Fanady on the stand if he thought the prosecution witnesses were lying. The 
Fanady court noted: 
• "[T]he court brought up an issue on its own motion. The court stated that the 
prosecutor may cross-examine defendant on the veracity of other witnesses, 
but the court thought that asking 'were they lying' questions is dangerous 
ground, noting that this was an area that had not yet been decided by the 
California Supreme Court. The court told the prosecutor that if she asked 
a question such as, 'are you calling him a liar?' the court would sustain an 
objection to that form of a question." 
78. People v. Hutto 2005 WL 1021253. 
79. People v. Fanady 2007 WL 155179. 
The California Prosecutor 2011 Integrity, Independence, Leadership 
• "[A]lthough the prosecutor disobeyed the court's order, the questions were a 
legitimate form of the 'were they lying' questions as set forth in Chatman and 
thus any error in disobeying the trial court's order was harmless." 
• "[T]he questions asked here were allowable inquiries." 
• "There is no reason to categorically exclude all such questions." 
• "The prosecutor's questions were improper only because they disregarded 
the court's instructions." 
The Fanaday court affirmed the judgment. And while no prosecutor should condone the 
failure to obey a court order, the conduct in this case did not meet the legal definition of 
prosecutorial misconduct. 
The NCIP Report alleges that prosecutorial misconduct "encompasses a wide range of 
improper tactics in criminal cases"80 yet fails to differentiate between inadvertent (or 
potentially inadvertent) conduct, and deliberate, intentional conduct by a prosecutor aimed 
at gaining an unfair advantage over the accused. This faulty analysis runs throughout the 
sampling of cases from NCIP' s list of "misconduct" cases. 
People v. Alders: Inadvertent Error 
(Cited in NCIP Report, Appendix B: Harmless Error Cases by Jurisdiction.) 
In People v. Alders,81 Defendant Alders was convicted by a jury of driving under the influence 
causing bodily injury, and driving with a suspended or revoked license. Alders filed an 
appeal, claiming prosecutorial misconduct. The contentions of Alders' misconduct claim 
were that the prosecutor made statements to the jury in his opening and closing arguments 
regarding Alders' prior driving-under-the-influence convictions. Such convictions were the 
basis for his suspended license. The Alders court found no misconduct in the prosecutor's 
opening statement. Later in the trial, the prosecutor and defense counsel had entered into 
stipulations regarding the prior convictions in an effort to avoid stating the nature of the 
defendant's convictions. Following the allegedly offending statement in closing argument, 
the defendant's motion for mistrial was denied, the trial court finding the error inadvertent. 
In the court's words: 
• "Defendant argues the prosecution should not have told the jury about 
defendant's prior convictions related to driving under the influence. 
However, because the prosecutor did nothing wrong, there was no basis for 
granting the motion." 
• "Although the prosecutor [also] erred by mentioning that section 23152, 
subdivision (b), pertains to driving while under the influence, we conclude 
the trial court did not err in denying the motion for mistrial on that basis." 
• "The prosecutor apologized, claiming the comment simply 'slipped' out." 
• "It appears the prosecutor's error was innocuous in the overall scheme of 
things." 
80. NCIP Report at 24. 
81. People v. Alders 2001 WL 133803. 
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People v. Barron: Prosecutorial Error Not Characterized as Misconduct 
(Cited in NCIP Report, Analysis of Cases Alleging Prosecutorial Misconduct.) 
Cited among cases where courts have found prosecutorial misconduct, People v. Barron82 is 
an example of prosecutorial error mischaracterized by NCIP as prosecutorial misconduct. 
In Barron, the defendant appealed following a jury conviction. Barron argued that the 
prosecutor committed misconduct during closing argument by commenting on a police 
officer's lack of motive to lie, and again when commenting on the defendant's opportunity 
to dispose of a knife before arrest. The Barron court found that the comment regarding the 
knife was not mischaracterized and not misconduct, but did find "error" with the comment 
on the officer's veracity. The court utilized the above cited state and federal definitions when 
analyzing the accusations of prosecutorial misconduct. The court found no prejudice and 
affirmed the judgment: 
"The prosecutor's comments on the police officers' lack of a motive to lie, and on 
defendant's opportunity to get rid of the knife before his arrest, did not constitute 
misconduct. The prosecutor's comment expressing her personal opinion supportive 
of Officer Campagna's veracity was error, but that error, even in combination with 
the error in excluding impeachment evidence aimed at Detective Rodriguez, could 
not have affected the outcome of the trial." 
People v. Larsen: Improper Characterization of the Evidence by a Prosecutor Not 
Prejudicial Misconduct 
(Cited in NCIP Report, Appendix B: Harmless Cases by Jurisdiction.) 
Prosecutors are "'given wide latitude during argument. The argument may be vigorous 
as long as it amounts to fair comment on the evidence, which can include reasonable 
inferences ... to be drawn therefrom."' 83 A sampling of the cases in Appendix B brings to 
light People v. Larsen,84 a case cited by the NCIP as one in which the court found prosecutorial 
misconduct. Larsen necessitates review as it shows how a prosecutor's drawing of an 
inference during argument, although deemed unsupported by the evidence adduced at trial 
by the appellate court, does not meet the definition of prosecutorial misconduct under the 
state and federal standards. 
Larsen appealed after his conviction for continuous sexual abuse of a child. In closing 
argument, the prosecutor emphasized the victim's statement that she was positive that the 
defendant was her abuser. He stated, "She lived with him. She had contact with him on a 
daily basis, almost, when he was at the house. She knows what he looks like, she knows what he 
smells like, she knows him. She is intimately familiar with him." The court found that there was 
no evidentiary foundation for arguing what the defendant smelled like. 
The Attorney General conceded that there was no direct evidence with respect to the 
defendant's body odor, but argued that the prosecutor's comment was a reasonable inference 
based on the fact that the victim had lived in the same residence with the defendant 
for years. The court rejected this argument and found the comment to be an improper 
characterization of the evidence. 
The allegations noted above were analyzed by the court using the federal and state 
definitions of prosecutorial misconduct. The court affirmed the judgment: 
82. People v. Barron 2009 WL 3923160. 
83. People v. Gamache (2010) 48 Cal.4th 347, 371 [People v. Stanley (2006) 39 Cal.4th 913, 951-952], rehearing 
denied (Apr. 22, 2010), cert. denied (U.S. 2010) 131 S.Ct. 591. 
84. People v. Larsen 2002 WL 31873618. 
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• "Appellant contends the prosecutor committed prejudicial misconduct when 
he asked appellant whether another witness had testified falsely and by 
arguing facts not in evidence. The record fails to support [appellant's] claim 
of prejudicial misconduct." 
• "[W]e conclude that this brief, solitary reference to appellant's body odor 
was de minimis when viewed in the context of the overwhelming evidence 
of appellant's guilt." 
• "The prosecutor's improper characterization of the evidence thus was 
harmless." 
• "On the issue of failure to object to prosecutorial misconduct, we conclude 
that the omission of such objections does not reflect ineffective assistance of 
counsel for the simply [sic] reason that there was no prejudicial misconduct." 
The NCIP Report goes on to categorize the 707 cases of misconduct into two types: improper 
witness examination and improper argument.85 Under the "witness examination" type, the 
report alleges that prosecutors' direct questioning of their own witnesses or challenging of 
defense witnesses through cross examination is improper when such questioning "misleads 
the jury or unfairly prejudices the defendant."86 The report noted that "While questioning 
resulting in the introduction of inadmissible evidence can be unintentional; this is often 
not the case."87 This blanket assertion is unsupported by data and, as demonstrated above, 
fails to otherwise distinguish between questioning resulting in error that is inadvertent, as 
opposed to intentional misconduct. 
People v. Barboza: Statement Made by Prosecution Witness Not Prejudicial 
(Cited in NCIP Report, Appendix B: Harmless Error Cases by Jurisdiction.) 
Another case cited in Appendix B as a "Harmless Case" where misconduct was nevertheless 
claimed to have been found, is People v. Barboza.88 In Barboza, the defendant appealed 
following a jury conviction for possession of a firearm by a felon, possession of drug 
paraphernalia, and resisting, obstructing, or delaying a peace officer. Two female prosecution 
witnesses reported that the defendant had exposed himself to them, and they ended up 
becoming identification witnesses in the trial for the above listed charges. The court allowed 
the two female witnesses to testify but ordered there should not be any mention of Barboza 
exposing himself to them. The court directed the prosecutor to admonish his witnesses. 
The prosecutor apparently did not admonish the detective he called to testify regarding 
identification of the defendant by the female witnesses. The prosecutor asked the detective 
about his contact with the female witnesses: Specifically, why he was sent to interview them. 
The detective replied, "I was assigned a Penal Code 314 [indecent exposure] case." The trial 
court struck the answer and ordered the jury to disregard it. 
The appellate court affirmed the judgment, agreeing with the trial court, which in denying 
Barboza's motion for mistrial stated: "I do not find there's been a miscarriage of justice. I do 
not find a reference to Penal Code Section 314 is automatically prejudicial .... "The appellate 
court concluded, "It follows from the foregoing discussion that the alleged errors, to the 
extent they were errors, were not prejudicial either individually or cumulatively." 
85. NCIP Report at 24. 
86. Id. 
87. Id. at 26. 
88. People v. Barboza 2003 WL 21310573. 
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Further categorizing specific types of prosecutorial misconduct, the NCIP Report presents 
statistical data purporting to show that, out of the 707 cases of misconduct, 444 of them 
involved improper argument by the prosecutor. The report states that "there are a multitude 
of ways in which prosecutors use improper methods in opening or closing arguments to try 
to persuade the jury to convict the defendant."89 
Again, this statement is not supported by authority or data, and no attempt is made to 
analyze intentional misconduct as distinct from statements made without any intention to 
mislead by a prosecutor during argument. 
People v. Banks: Statement by Prosecutor Noted as Potentially Lacking Intent to Mislead 
Yet Categorized as Misconduct 
(Cited by NCIP Report, Appendix B: Harmless Cases by Jurisdiction.) 
As noted in the example that follows, even some courts are quick to categorize inadvertent 
errors as "misconduct." In People v. Banks/0 the court found: 
• ''Defendant contends it was misconduct for the prosecutor to tell the jury he had well 
over a month to dispose of evidence when in fact he had been arrested the day after 
the offenses. We agree." 
• "It may not have been the prosecutor's intent to mislead the jury, but her comment 
clearly could have had that effect, by suggesting defendant had more than a day to 
get rid of inculpatory evidence." 
• "In our view, had the prosecutor not made the offending comment, it is not 
reasonably probable defendant would have obtained a more favorable result." 
In other words, the evidence of guilt outweighed the impact of a harmless comment. The 
court affirmed the judgment. 
People v. Wrest: Invoking Religious Authority 
(Although cited in the NCIP Report's analysis, Wrest was not listed in either of the 
Appendices.) 
In analyzing cases involving improper argument by prosecutors, the NCIP Report asserts, 
"It is misconduct for the prosecutor to invoke religious authority."91 Citing the case of People 
v. Wrest, 92 the report maintains that prosecution reliance on religious authority in support of 
the death penalty "tends to diminish the jury's sense of responsibility for its verdict and to 
imply than [sic] another, higher law should be applied."93 References to religious topics by 
the prosecutor found in Wrest were the following: 
• "I could talk to you about Scripture and verse from the Old Testament that 
supports capital punishment. But I'm not." 
• "I'm not going to talk about the fact of whether the death penalty could provide 
someone with the opportunity to repent at the time of death or whether a long 
stay in prison will allow somebody to find God or find rehabilitation."94 
89. NCIP Report at 24. 
90. People v. Banks 2005 WL 1303552. 
91. NCIP Report at 30. 
92. People v. Wrest (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1088. 
93. Id. at 31, quoting Wrest, supra, at 1107. 
94. Wrest, supra, at 1106. 
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The Wrest court held, "When considered in context, however, the prosecutor's remarks were 
not prejudicial .... The same can be said of the prosecutor's brief reference to Scripture, 
which was totally undeveloped in the course of the argument."95 The court noted that even 
assuming error or misconduct, each of appellant's examples of allegedly improper argument 
could have been cured by a timely admonition had he objected at trial.96 
People v. Estrada: Aggressive Cross-Examination and Comment During Argument Is Not 
Prosecutorial Misconduct 
Included within the NCIP Report is another case that warrants inquiry. Cited as a case where 
prosecutorial misconduct was found, yet ruled harmless, People v. Estrada97 sheds bright 
light on the convenient and limited analysis used in the methodology of the NCIP Report. 
In Estrada, the defendant was convicted of second-degree robbery. The defendant appealed, 
claiming several instances of prosecutorial misconduct. While on the witness stand under 
cross-examination, the defendant alleged that it was prosecutorial misconduct for the 
prosecutor to accuse her of lying to another judge and ask if she would lie when such a lie 
suited her purpose. The trial court had sustained an objection to these questions. 
The appellate court analyzed the questions at issue under the state and federal definition 
of prosecutorial misconduct and found no violation, concluding that the prosecutor may 
have been overly aggressive but it was not "egregious, deceptive, or reprehensible conduct." 
The defendant went on to allege instances of prosecutorial misconduct in the prosecutor's 
aggressive questioning of her, along with an accusation of misconduct when the prosecutor 
accused her of "stalling" in order to formulate an answer to the prosecutor's question. While 
the court did feel the prosecutor "went too far" with the last comment, the misconduct 
allegations did not meet the requisite definitions, and the judgment was affirmed. Excerpts 
from the court ruling follow: 
• "We find neither a federal nor state violation by the above cross examination. 
While the prosecutor may have been overly aggressive, he was attempting to 
show that defendant was willing to lie to a court (and thus to a jury) in order to 
achieve a benefit." 
• "We must assume that any witness being aggressively cross examined is going to 
feel a measure of derision. That does not necessarily translate into impropriety." 
• "At one point, defendant asked the prosecutor to repeat a question. He 
responded by accusing her of stalling so she could formulate an answer. He 
made a comment about how defendant might lie to the judge during sentencing 
but should not lie to the prosecutor. The trial court sustained a defense objection. 
The prosecutor went too far here, essentially arguing the case by phrasing his 
comments as questions." 
• "In spite of this, we find no egregious, deceptive, or reprehensible conduct. In 
aggressively cross-examining defendant, the prosecutor was trying to call into 
question her claim of how she reacted to the claimed rape. This portion of the 
cross-examination consumed but a moment in an ongoing give and take between 
the prosecutor and defendant. The prosecutor was not trying to deceive the jury. 
Instead, he was challenging defendant to try to explain her conduct." 
95. Id. at 1107. 
96. Id. at 1105. 
97. People v. Estrada 2002 WL 1883373. 
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• "We find no misconduct and no impact on the outcome of the trial." 
• "Finally, defendant claims misconduct in the following comments by the 
prosecutor during his jury argument: 'We've heard evidence about all kinds 
of things including a rape but the only issue is whether a robbery occurs and 
whether she did it, and if he's as confident as he says and wants you to believe 
about our failure of proof that there was a robbery and that his client did it, he 
would have stood up and said there was no robbery, there's no evidence of it, 
good night, and sit down, but he spends 45 minutes telling you why there is no 
robbery and why the People have failed to prove there was a robbery."' 
• "[T]he prosecutor's comment is within the bounds of acceptability." 
Curable Error 
A recurring theme found in many of the cases listed in the NCIP Report is defense counsel's 
failure to object to questions or argument made by the prosecutor. The Wrest case above is a 
clear example of a court's assertion that an error can be cured by a timely admonition, with 
the court noting, "No objection was made to any of these instances at trial; appellant fails 
to demonstrate that, assuming misconduct, an admonition would have been an ineffective 
remedy."98 
In People v. Cooper (cited in the NCIP Report, Appendix Bas a harmless case), the court noted, 
We have no quarrel with defendant's basic proposition, namely, that misconduct 
occurs when a prosecutor misstates the law. [Citation.] To the extent that the 
prosecutor's comments implied that the jury could not consider why logical 
witnesses were not called, misconduct occurred. [Citation.] However, the court's 
comments to the jury cured any error.99 
People v. Ray: Factually Incorrect Error Waived by Defense Counsel's Failure to Object 
(Cited in NCIP Report, Appendix B: Harmless Cases by Jurisdiction.) 
• "[T]he prosecutor incorrectly stated that defense counsel fabricated the 
testimony." 
• "[Appellant] Ray waived his claim concerning this misconduct by failing 
to object and seek an appropriate admonition in the trial court. [Citation.] 
The trial court could have informed the jury that the prosecutor's attack on 
defense counsel was factually incorrect and improper."100 
People v. McCall: Error Cured by Timely Objection and Admonishment 
(Cited in NCIP Report, Appendix B: Harmless Cases by Jurisdiction.) 
• "Defendant contends that the prosecutor committed misconduct when she 
mentioned the term 'homicide' on two occasions when she was questioning 
witnesses."101 
98. Wrest, supra, at 1108. 
99. People v. Cooper 2004 WL 407156. 
100. People v. Ray 2002 WL 64543. 
101. People v. McCall2001 WL 1382746. 
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• "[D]uring a break in the proceedings, defense counsel noted the court's 
pretrial admonition not to mention the term 'homicide.' The trial court told 
the prosecutor, 'I'm assuming, Ms. Houser, that you forgot I ordered you not 
to do that.' The prosecutor answered, 'Yes."'102 
• "The trial court admonished the prosecutor and instructed the jury that 
statements made by the attorneys during trial were not evidence. In light of 
the entire record, defendant was not deprived of a fair trial and, therefore, 
reversal is not required."103 
People v. Broyles: No Prejudicial Prosecutorial Misconduct Found; No Objection by 
Defense Counsel 
(Cited in NCIP Report, Appendix B: Harmless Cases by Jurisdiction.) 
• "Defendant contends that the prosecutor committed prejudicial misconduct 
by stating 'facts' about defendant's connection with Missouri that were 
not part of the evidence. He contends that further misconduct occurred 
when, in final argument, 'the prosecutor relied on the definition of 
circumstantial evidence provided in CALJIC No. 2.01, by distinguishing 
between an unreasonable and reasonable interpretation of the evidence.' And 
recognizing that no objection was interposed to either of these assignments 
of misconduct, defendant alternatively contends that trial counsel rendered 
constitutionally ineffective assistance by failing to object. We find no merit in 
defendant's contentions."104 
• "Had defense counsel objected and requested a curative admonition, 
such admonition would have [e]nsured that the evidence would be 
disregarded."105 
THE NCIP REPORT'S USE OF THE TERM "PROSECUTORIAL 
MISCONDUCT" IS IMPROPER AND MISLEADING 
As we have stated, a major flaw in the NCIP Report, and its 2010 addendum, is the 
misuse of the term "prosecutorial misconduct." Like many phrases in the field of law, 
"prosecutorial misconduct" has a specific legal meaning that does not directly correlate 
with the term as understood by the general public. The report does not restrict the use of 
the term "prosecutorial misconduct'' to its true legal definition. As a result, the report is 
able to grossly exaggerate the frequency of misconduct that occurs in criminal prosecutions 
in California, and portray the State Bar and state prosecutor's offices as accepting of bad 
behavior. It can only be assumed that the Innocence Project, funded originally to exonerate 
the factually innocent by providing DNA testing where appropriate, attempts to ensure its 
continued existence and funding by creating the misperception that wrongful conduct by 
prosecutors is rampant. 
102. Id. 
103. Id. 
104. People v. Broyles 2003 WL 1984557. 
105. Id. 
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The NCIP Report erroneously claims that courts made "specific findings of misconduct"106 in 
707 criminal cases, then it divides those cases into two distinct categories. The first category, 
"Harmful Error" is represented to include cases where "misconduct was found and where 
the finding resulted in courts setting aside convictions or sentences, declaring mistrials, or 
barring evidence."107 The second category, "Harmless Error," is represented to include cases 
where misconduct was found, but the court upheld the conviction because the error did 
not interfere with the fundamental fairness of the trial. These representations are false and 
misleading. 
In many cases cited under both categories, the court never made findings of misconduct 
because, while there may have been errors, there was no misconduct. For example, in three 
of the nine San Diego County cases cited in the "Harmful Error" category, the court never 
found misconduct by the prosecutor.108 While the convictions were reversed, in one of the 
cases the reversal was not based upon prosecutorial misconduct but rather on the failure of 
the defense attorney to object to the prosecutor's error in misstating the law.109 In that case, 
had there been a timely objection, the error could have been cured by the court. In another 
case, although the court found statutory error as a result of the prosecutor's conduct before 
the grand jury, there was neither a finding of misconduct nor was a conviction or sentence 
set aside, a mistrial declared, or evidence barred.U0 In the third case, the court referred to the 
prosecutor's conduct as "alleged" conduct and never made a finding of misconduct or error. 
There, the facts admitted by the defense demonstrated the prosecutor had, in fact, disclosed 
the information the defense attorney alleged had been withheld. 
The NCIP Report also wrongfully alleged that there were findings of misconduct in Jacques, 
a case still under review at the time the report was published, including Jacques within 
the "Harmful Error" category of cases.111 In Jacques, there was debate about whether the 
prosecutor had turned inculpatory evidence over to the defense. Because the defense 
attorney had commented upon the absence of such evidence in the jury selection process, the 
court decided to bar the evidence in the prosecutor's case in chief to ensure the defendant a 
fair trial, without regard to whether or not it had been previously disclosed.112 ln response to 
the San Diego County District Attorney's inquiry about the propriety of including Jacques, 
author Maurice Possley responded in a letter, 
We are not bound to include only those cases where the specific words 
"prosecutorial misconduct" are used but rather rely on judicial decision to 
impose sanctions ranging from reversal of conviction or sentence to granting 
of a new trial, to the barring [sic] evidence. 
Such a response indicates a failure to recognize that courts use their discretion to bar 
evidence and grant new trials for many reasons unrelated to prosecutorial misconduct. 
The NCIP Report's "Harmless Error" category of misconduct cases, by definition, can only 
include cases involving deliberate misconduct. This is because unintentional errors support 
106. NCIP Report at 10. 
107. NCIP Report at 13. 
108. NCIP Report, Appendix A. 
109. People v. Anzalone (2005) 29 Cal.Rptr.3d 689 [section relating to allegation of misconduct subsequently 
depublished]. 
110. People v. Berardi (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 476. 
111. In the initial publication, Jacques was listed in the Harmless Error category of cases in Appendix B at 
110; Jacques 2002 WL 31862703. 
112. This case was ultimately removed from the online version of the NCIP Report. 
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a finding of misconduct only if the errors are "harmful." Admittedly in the list of 28 cases 
from San Diego County in the "Harmless Error" category, there are two that have a finding 
that the prosecutor deliberately misled the jury, though no prejudice was found. 113 0nly one 
of them was a published case.114 In 23 of the cases, defense allegations of misconduct were 
rejected, with courts in some of the cases explicitly stating that there was "no misconduct." If 
mistakes were made, the court rightly referred to them as "error," not "misconduct." Many 
of the cases even set forth the true definition of misconduct that the NCIP Report authors 
clearly chose to ignore. 
The NCIP premise that a systemic problem exists in the criminal justice system with respect 
to prosecutorial ethics is not supported by the facts. The NCIP Report was only able to 
make such arguments by disregarding the legal definition of prosecutorial misconduct and 
imposing its own broader definitions, even then using strained interpretations of them. It 
was not enough to identify cases where misconduct was actually found by the court during 
the defined time period-because prosecutorial misconduct is exceedingly rare and, where 
it does exist, is dealt with effectively by the courts, the state bar, and prosecutors' Offices 
throughout the state. 
RESPONSE TO THE NCIP REPORT'S ADDITIONAL 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
The NCIP Report self-proclaims its "in-depth analysis of prosecutorial accountability in 
California has proven the system is flawed[,]" 115 and makes several recommendations it 
purports will be a first step to eliminating the problem. The report's failure to establish 
meaningful standards for the data it gathered, the outright inaccuracies in properly 
collecting the data under these standards, and the misleading and biased presentations of 
the data beg the question whether any conclusion of the report warrants discussion. The 
report fails to recognize that the current policies were not developed in a vacuum or on a 
whim. Rather, the current policies developed over centuries out of necessity as reasoned 
responses to societal problems and compelling public interests. The NCIP Report appears 
to give no consideration to the reasons these policies came about or the cost to society in 
changing them. 
Ethics Training 
The report recommends development of a training course that specifically addresses ethical 
issues that commonly arise in criminal cases. While the report recommends additional 
training, it does not consider what types of training are currently being conducted. Instead, 
it simply recommends a training course without assessing actual training needs or the costs 
to counties, municipalities, and District Attorney Offices of providing the training. 
District Attorneys' Office Policies 
The NCIP Report recommends District Attorney Offices adopt internal policies to track 
and investigate complaints of prosecutorial misconduct, and policies that do not tolerate 
misconduct. Again, the report fails to support its recommendation with data identifying a 
shortcoming. The report never examined the policies that are in place. 
This recommendation appears to be a response to the inaccurate collection of data that 
mischaracterizes any error by a prosecutor as prosecutorial misconduct. As a result of the 
113. Gaylord 2003 WL 21403797; Roybal (1998) 19 Cal.4th 481. 
114. Roybal, supra. 
115. NCIP Report at 78. 
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mischaracterization of this data, the report's authors incorrectly identify a problem that does 
not exist. Then, they assume no policies are in place to address the problem they mistakenly 
identified because they see no action taking place to address the nonexistent problem. 
On the rare occasions when prosecutorial misconduct does occur, District Attorney Offices 
take action to address the problems, as does the State Bar of California when appropriate. 
Expansion of the Reporting Requirements 
The NCIP Report recommends expanding the courts' reporting requirement to report to 
the State Bar any case of "egregious" misconduct, regardless of whether the case resulted 
in reversal. Also, the report alleges that courts are not meeting the existing reporting 
requirements and argues for greater transparency in the reporting of misconduct claiming, 
"[T]hat it is virtually impossible to assess judicial compliance with the obligation to report 
misconduct to the State Bar and to notify attorneys found to have committed misconduct."116 
If the NCIP Report is unable to assess judicial compliance, it obviously raises questions 
as to the accuracy of its conclusion that courts are underreporting cases of prosecutorial 
misconduct. This recommendation is, once again, likely a response to the report's flawed 
categorizing of data, which causes the NCIP Report to overstate the number of cases of 
reportable prosecutorial misconduct. 
Throughout California, every court day, prosecutors make thousands of split-second 
decisions on whether to object, on what grounds to object, what question to ask next, how 
to respond to a defense attorney's argument, and so forth. Errors will occur. What the 
review of the cases listed in the NCIP Report actually shows is that, despite the thousands of 
split-second decisions made daily, very few errors are made, and even fewer that affect the 
fairness of a defendant's trial. 
Additionally, reporting every mistake a prosecutor makes, or even the "egregious" 
misconduct the suggested rule change incorporates, would do more harm than good. The 
"egregious" standard is vague and, without more specificity, almost meaningless. The 
adversarial system employed in courts as part of our justice system is designed both to 
protect a defendant's rights and to seek the truth. Sometimes defense counsel make claims 
of misconduct against a prosecutor during the course of a trial; such accusations are often 
designed to quell a prosecutor's zeal in the courtroom. Yet, as the California Supreme Court 
has noted, "[z]ealous advocacy in pursuit of convictions forms an essential part of the 
prosecutor's proper duties .... "117 
The public has a right to expect the prosecutor to meet and overcome opposing counsel's 
attacks in the courtroom in order to seek justice. The proposed rule would make these 
groundless attacks more commonplace and more burdensome for the prosecutor. 
Additionally, it would require courts to continually adjudicate matters not related to the 
case before the court, both distracting the court and slowing the proceedings. Moreover, 
increasing the reporting requirements may very well hinder the important work of the State 
Bar. As the sampling of the cases cited shows, the vast majority do not meet the report's 
claimed standard of "using deceptive and unfair tactics to secure convictions." However, all 
reports require investigation. If the vast number of reports do not involve the reprehensible 
conduct of which the authors purport to complain, then legitimate investigations will be 
delayed as frivolous complaints are investigated, and resources will be spread too thin to 
conduct proper investigations. 
116. NCIP Report at 80. 
117. People v. Superior Court (Humberto S.) (2008) 43 Cal.4th 737, 747, quoting from People v. Vasquez (2006) 
39 Cal.4th 47, 65. 
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Inclusion of the Prosecutors' Names in Opinions 
The NCIP Report claims "[i]n some cases, [prosecutors] may have no idea that a court ruled 
they committed misconduct[,]" 118 and contends that including names in opinions will help 
alleviate this problem. Ironically, the citation the report uses to support this contention refers 
to a conversation with a prosecutor about a case where the court did not find prosecutorial 
misconduct. The report simply does not identify any logical basis for its conclusion. 
Regardless, the report fails to identify how its suggestion of including names in opinions 
would solve the problem it says exists. The real objective of this recommendation seems to 
be the same as noted above, to quell the zeal of the prosecutor in the courtroom with the 
threat of public obliquity from persons unfamiliar with the case. As noted above, given the 
adversarial nature of the American court system, the public has a right to have a zealous 
advocate acting on its behalf in the courtroom. 
Adoption of ABA Model Rule 3.8 
The NCIP Report recommends adoption of the American Bar Association's Model Rule 3.8. 
in its entirety.119 This rule is not needed. Rule 3.8 encompasses much more than discussed 
in the report. The reasons espoused in the report for adopting the rule were to make it a 
118. NCIP Report at 23. 
119. ABA Model Rule 3.8 reads in its entirety: 
Special Responsibilities Of A Prosecutor- The prosecutor in a criminal case shall: 
(a) refrain from prosecuting a charge that the prosecutor knows is not supported by probable 
cause; 
(b) make reasonable efforts to assure that the accused has been advised of the right to, and the 
procedure for obtaining, counsel and has been given reasonable opportunity to obtain counsel; 
(c) not seek to obtain from an unrepresented accused a waiver of important pretrial rights, such as 
the right to a preliminary hearing; 
(d) make timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or information known to the prosecutor 
that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates the offense, and, in connection with 
sentencing, disclose to the defense and to the tribunal all unprivileged mitigating information known 
to the prosecutor, except when the prosecutor is relieved of this responsibility by a protective order of 
the tribunal; 
(e) not subpoena a lawyer in a grand jury or other criminal proceeding to present evidence about a 
past or present client unless the prosecutor reasonably believes: 
(1) the information sought is not protected from disclosure by any applicable privilege; 
(2) the evidence sought is essential to the successful completion of an ongoing investigation or 
prosecution; and 
(3) there is no other feasible alternative to obtain the information; 
(f) except for statements that are necessary to inform the public of the nature and extent of the 
prosecutor's action and that serve a legitimate law enforcement purpose, refrain from making 
extrajudicial comments that have a substantial likelihood of heightening public condemnation of the 
accused and exercise reasonable care to prevent investigators, law enforcement personnel, employees 
or other persons assisting or associated with the prosecutor in a criminal case from making an 
extrajudicial statement that the prosecutor would be prohibited from making under Rule 3.6 or this 
Rule. 
(g) When a prosecutor knows of new, credible and material evidence creating a reasonable 
likelihood that a convicted defendant did not commit an offense of which the defendant was 
convicted, the prosecutor shall: 
(1) promptly disclose that evidence to an appropriate court or authority, and 
(2) if the conviction was obtained in the prosecutor's jurisdiction, 
(i) promptly disclose that evidence to the defendant unless a court authorizes delay, and 
(ii) undertake further investigation, or make reasonable efforts to cause an investigation, to 
determine whether the defendant was convicted of an offense that the defendant did not commit. 
(h) When a prosecutor knows of clear and convincing evidence establishing that a defendant 
in the prosecutor's jurisdiction was convicted of an offense that the defendant did not commit, the 
prosecutor shall seek to remedy the conviction. 
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disciplinary offense to (1) prosecute a charge without probable cause, (2) seek to have an 
unrepresented defendant waive rights, (3) subpoena a lawyer in a grand jury proceeding, or 
(4) make public comments that might harm a defendant and (5) to mandate that prosecutors 
disclose all exculpatory or mitigating evidence and (6) make reasonable efforts to ensure 
defendants know of their right to counsel. This far exceeds the scope of the NCIP Report and 
is better discussed elsewhere. 
Prosecutors in California are already required to disclose all exculpatory and mitigating 
evidence. As discussed, this is mandated by the United States Supreme Court decision in 
Brady v. Maryland. 12° California Penal Code section 1054.1 requires this as well. Adoption of 
ABA Model3.8 adds no additional requirements. 
Model Rule 3.8 precludes a prosecutor from subpoenaing an attorney in a grand jury or 
other criminal proceeding to present evidence about a past or present client, unless the 
prosecutor reasonably believes the information sought is not protected from disclosure by 
any applicable privilege, the evidence sought is essential to the successful completion of an 
ongoing investigation or prosecution, and there is no other feasible alternative to obtain the 
information. The NCIP Report does not even attempt to provide evidence or otherwise reach 
a conclusion that this is a problem in California. Moreover, nothing else indicates that this is 
a problem in California. As such, this provides no basis for the adoption of the rule. 
CONCLUSION 
As confirmed by the court in People v. Hill: 
A prosecutor is held to a standard higher than that imposed on other 
attorneys because of the unique function he or she performs in representing 
the interests, and in exercising the sovereign power, of the state. [Citation.] 
As the United States Supreme Court has explained, the prosecutor represents 
"a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as 
its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal 
prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done."121 
Other attorneys must act as zealous advocates for their clients, and put their clients' interests 
first, even when such interests are at odds with the best interests of society. The prosecutor, 
however, has both the opportunity and the obligation to seek justice every time he or she 
walks into a courtroom. 
As the Peoples' advocate seeking justice, the prosecutor must remain independent. 
That independence allows him or her to fearlessly prosecute criminals, regardless of the 
criminals' stature in society. The independence of the prosecutor provides for equal justice 
for the rich and the poor, for the powerful and the weak, for the influential and the voiceless. 
The independence of the prosecutor is critical to equal justice under law. 
Historically prosecutors have come under attack by various special interest groups from 
time to time. The reports issued by such groups are generally premised on the assumption 
that prosecutorial misconduct goes undetected and unreported, and prosecutors are 
undisciplined. This assumption allows the groups to reach their desired conclusions and 
ignore data that says otherwise. 
120. Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83. 
121. Hill, supra, at 820, quoting Espinoza, supra, at 819-820. 
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The actual data shows that because of the unique situation of the prosecutor, including the 
ability to strive for justice, the same factors that lead to a vast majority of attorney discipline 
are not present with prosecutors. 
The NCIP Report in particular not only ignores the data that refutes the authors' desired 
claims, it uses a faulty collection of incomplete and imprecise data to reach conclusions 
that promote its own agenda. The report refers to the legal definition of prosecutorial 
misconduct, but then ignores this standard and the court's actual rulings when collecting its 
data. 
The report claims that it compiled only cases where courts explicitly found prosecutorial 
misconduct. As we have shown, a mere sampling of the cases relied upon by the NCIP 
Report proves this is not the case. 
As a result of its flawed data collection, the NCIP not only assumes a problem that does 
not exist, it makes recommendations on the basis of its assumptions and flawed data. 
The recommendations give no consideration to the historical background underlying the 
necessity of the current policies. 
Any proper discussion of policy changes such as eliminating immunity must discuss 
the reasons for the current policy. The NCIP Report does not. Its recommendations, if 
implemented, would create unequal justice without any corresponding benefits. 
Prosecutors are offended by this attack on their integrity, but are more concerned that the 
recommendations of the NCIP Report would intertwine the Innocence Project's agenda 
with the prosecutor's obligation to seek equal justice for all people. The public has a right to 
expect prosecutors to go into the competitive court environment every day, diligently and 
fearlessly seeking justice for all. The recommended actions in the NCIP Report would make 
this impossible-and possibly upset the scales of justice. 
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